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TRAGEDY, IRONY, AND 
PROTECTIONISM AFTER BCCI: 
A THREE-ACT PLAY STARRING 
MAHARAJAH BANK 
Raj Bhala* 
ABSTRACf 
Post-BCCI legal developments regarding the regulation of foreign 
banks raise serious concerns of protectionism. The Foreign Bank Su-
pervision Enhancement Act of 1991 and revisions to Federal Reserve 
Regulation K impose significant new legal burdens on foreign banks 
seeking to establish a physical presence in the U.S. 
The new legal regime reflects a tragic sacrifice of the principle of 
free trade in banking services in order to placate a fear of "bad" 
foreign banks. Ironically, the sacrifice of this principle by Congress 
and the Federal Reserve is incongruous with efforts of the United 
States Trade Representative (USTR). The USTR has negotiated a 
final General Agreement on Trade in Services which could liberalize 
market access for banks around the world. The tragedy and irony of 
post-BCCI legal developments are highlighted by the case of a hypo-
thetical foreign bank, the Maharajah Bank of India. 
Greater efforts to ensure that the U.S. banking market remains 
open are necessary, or else the significant economic benefits from 
foreign bank presence in the U.S. will be lost. Accordingly, a mar-
ket-oriented approach to foreign bank regulation is proposed. 
© Copyright 1994, Raj Bhala. 
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I. NIEBUHR AND FOREIGN BANK REGULATION 
The tragic element in a human situation is constituted of conscious 
choices of evil for the sake of good. If men or nations do evil in a 
good cause; if they cover themselves with guilt in order to fulfill 
some high responsibility; or if they sacrifice some high value for the 
sake of a higher or equal one they make a tragic choice . . . . Tragedy 
elicits admiration as well as pity because it combines nobility with 
guilt. 
Irony consists of apparently fortuitous incongruities in life which 
are discovered, upon closer examination, to be not merely fortuitous. 
Incongruity as such is merely comedy . . . . But irony is something 
more than comedy . . . . If virtue becomes vice through some hidden 
defect in the virtue ... the situation is ironic. 
-Reinhold Niebuhrl 
13 
T HE Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) affair was a horror story for bank regulators and law enforcement au-thority. Using Professor Niebuhr's definitions of "tragedy" and 
"irony," the legal aftermath can be understood as a play whose genre is 
tragedy and irony. That aftermath is the enactment of the Foreign Bank 
Supervision Enhancement Act- of 1991 (FBSEA) by Congress and the 
promulgation of revisions to Regulation K (revised Regulation K) by the 
Federal Reserve.2 The thesis of this article is that the post-BCCI legal 
1. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE IRONY OF AMERICAN HISTORY Vii-viii (1952) (emphasis 
supplied). 
2. FBSEA is Title II, Subtitle A of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Im-
provement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2286-2305 (1991). FBSEA amends 
numerous provisions of the International Banking Act (IBA) and is codified in various 
sections of Title 12 of the United States Code. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3111 (Supp. IV 1992). 
Plainly, FBSEA was a response to the BCCI affair. See, e.g., James R. Kraus, Congress 
Seen Tightening Oversight of Foreign Banks, AM. BANKER, Oct. 28, 1991, at 1. 
For discussions of the legislative history of FBSEA, see Daniel E. Danovitch & George 
P. Macdonald, U.S. Congressional Banking Agenda Begins To Take Shape, 6 BUT-
TERWORTHS J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 224 (1991); David W. Fanikos, Note, The Foreign 
Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991: Necessary Additions and Amendments to the 
International Banking Act of 1978 or Legislative Overreaction to Recent Foreign Bank Scan-
dals, 16 SuFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 482, 486-99 (1993); Cynthia Lichtenstein, U.S. Re-
structuring Legislation: Revising the International Banking Act of 1978, For The Worse?, 60 
FoRDHAM L. REv. S37, S39-44 (1992). For general treatments of the principle features of 
FBSEA, see Serge Bellanger, Stormy Weather: The FBSEA 's Impact on Foreign Banks, 25 
BANKER's MAG. 7 (Nov.-Dec. 1992); David B. Gail et al., The Foreign Bank Supervision 
Enhancement Act of 1991: Expanding the Umbrella of "Supervisory Reregulation", 26 
INT'L LAW. 993 (1992); James C. Sivon, The Impact of the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration Improvement Act on the Supervision and Regulation of Foreign Banks Operating 
in the USA, 7 BurrERWORTHS J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 54 (1992). 
Regulation K of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 211 (1993). Interim revisions were published by the Federal Reserve at 57 Fed. 
Reg. 12,992 (Apr. 15, 1992). For an overview of the interim revisions, see Michael L. Whit-
ener, New Federal Reserve Board Regulations Regarding Banks in the United States, 26 
INT'L LAW. 1007 (1992). See also Fed's Interim Rule May Result in Some Foreign Banks 
Choosing to Bypass the U.S., Banking Daily (BNA) (Apr. 30, 1992). The final revisions 
were published at 58 Fed. Reg. 6348 (Jan. 28, 1993). See Fed Adopts Final Rule Replacing 
Interim Regulation on Foreign Bank Supervision, Banking Daily (BNA) (Jan. 19, 1993). 
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regime for foreign bank regulation is tragically and ironically protection-
ist. This thesis is articulated through three acts, in which a hypothetical 
foreign bank, Maharajah Bank of India, attempts to enter and expand its 
activities in the U.S. banking market. 
A. BCCI AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN BANKING SERVICES 
In July 1991, the headline on the cover of Time magazine was "The 
World's Sleaziest Bank," referring, of course, to ·BCCJ.3 On December 
16, 1993, a headline in the Wall Street Journal proclaimed "Trade Pact Is 
Set by 117 Nations, Slashing Tariffs, Subsidies Globally."4 There would 
appear to be no connection between these two headlines. In fact, there is 
a very strong but tragic and ironic connection between stories about 
BCCI and multilateral trade negotiations. The hysteria surrounding the 
BCCI case led to the adoption of a protectionist statute by Congress and 
regulati<?n by the Federal Reserve. These new rules effectively exacer-
Unless otherwise noted, the "Federal Reserve," as used herein, refers to the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the twelve regional Federal Reserve banks. 
3. TIME, July 29, 1991, cover page. · 
The BCCI group had one top-tier shell holding company, BCCI Holdings, S.A., incorpo-
rated in Luxembourg. BCCI Holdings, S.A., in turn, owned all of the shares of two operat-
ing holding companies, BCCI, S.A., a Luxembourg company, and BCCI Overseas, 
incorporated in the Cayman Islands. The two operating companies owned subsidiaries, 
branches, agencies, and representative offices in sixty-nine countries covering every conti-
nent except Antarctica. 
See The BCCI Affair: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Narcotics, and Inter-
national Operations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5, 
at 323, 449-460 (1992) (testimony of Brian Smouha, Court Appointed Fiduciary for BCCI 
Holdings, S.A., and BCCI, S.A. (hereinafter Senate Subcommittee Hearings). 
At one time, BCCI was the seventh-largest private bank in the world and the 200th 
largest bank in the world overall, with stated capital of $1.5 billion and stated assets worth 
over $20 billion. Senate Subcommittee Hearings, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 86 (1991) 
(statement of J. Virgil Mattingly, Jr., General Counsel, and William Taylor, Staff Director 
for Banking Supervision and Regulation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem). See also E. Gerald Corrigan et al., The Federal Reserve's Views on BCCI, 26 INT'L. 
LAw. 963, 968 (1992); Richard Donkin, BCCI Dealings Are Being Watched by Central 
Banks, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 18, 1988, at 28, col. 3. For diagrams of the complex 
organizational structure of BCCI and related entities, see RAJ BHALA, FoREIGN BANK 
REGULATION AFTER BCCI, charts I and II, pp. xxi and xxiii, respectively (1994) [hereinaf-
ter BHALA). 
Officials at the Central Intelligence Agency humorously referred to BCCI as the "Bank 
of Crooks and Criminals International." Allegedly, BCCI provided financial services to 
terrorists, dictators, and narcotics and arms dealers, though few, if any, of these allegations 
have been proven in a court of law in any country. BCCI pled guilty to secretly owning 
and controlling banks in the United States, including the First American banks. For an 
explanation of the BCCI-First American relationship and a diagram thereof see BHALA, 
ch. I and chart III, p. xxiv. 
On July 5, 1991, bank regulators in several countries shut down BCCI's offices. At the 
time BCCI was closed, two uninsured, state-licensed agencies operated in the U.S., one in 
New York and one in Los Angeles. Both were agencies of BCCI, S.A. 
4. Bob Davies & Lawrence Ingrassia, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 1993, at A3. Similar 
exultant headlines appeared in other publications. See, e.g., GATT, Uruguay Round Nego-
tiations Conclude Successfully, (Dec. 21, 1993); Surprise, Surprise, EcoNOMIST, Jan. 22, 
1994; GATT Comes Right . .. , EcoNOMIST, Dec. 18, 1993, at 13;· Uruguay Round Agreement 
Is Reached: Clinton Notifies Congress Under Fast Track, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2103 
(Dec. 15, 1993). 
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bate the difficulties faced by foreign banks seeking access to the U.S. fi-
nancial market. Consequently, the new rules are at variance with the 
successful efforts of the United States Trade Representative {USTR) to 
negotiate a final multilateral General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS).5 The provisions of GATS are aimed at enhancing market access 
around the world for banks and other financial institutions (as well as 
other service businesses) from countries that are members of the accord.6 
Much has been said and written about both the BCCI affair and the 
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), under whose auspices the GATS was negotiated. The interna-
tional financial community was rocked by allegations concerning the ac-
tivities of BCCI. Hearings were held in the U.S. Senate before the 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations of 
the Committee on Foreign Relations through 1991 and 1992, which pro-
duced six large volumes of testimonial and documentary evidence? Simi-
larly, the international trade community was riveted by the Uruguay 
5. 33 I.L.M. 46 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]. The GATS is reprinted in OFFICE OF THE 
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE 
URUGUAY RoUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (version of 15 Dec. 1993). 
For overviews of the GATS, see 33 I.L.M. 44-46 (1994); Karl P. Sauvant & Jong Weber, 
The International Legal Framework for Transactions in Services, in LAw AND PRACTICE 
UNDER THE GATT AND OTHER TRADING ARRANGEMENTS 15-31 (Karl P. Sauvant & Jong 
Weber eds., 1992) [hereinafter Sauvant & Weber]. See also RAJ BHALA, THE UNFINISHED 
BUSINESS OF THE URUGUAY RoUND (forthcoming, manuscript on file with author). 
The post-BCCI banking regime also conflicts with the efforts of the U.S. Secretary of the 
Treasury to negotiate bilateral accords directed at enhancing market access for financial 
services. These efforts have been especially vigorous with respect to Asian countries. See 
Kenneth H. Bacon, China to Expand Foreign Banks' Rights As U.S. Helps with Economic 
Managing, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 1992, at A2; Kenneth H. Bacon, Bentsen Unveils Effort to 
Open Capital Markets, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 1994, at A2. 
The institutional inconsistencies are not limited to the behavior of the USTR, on the one 
hand, and the Congress and the Federal Reserve, on the other hand. Congress (namely, 
the Senate Finance Committee and the House.Ways and Means Committee), along with 
the USTR, play important roles in the formulation of trade policy.· See generally I. M. 
DRESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 11-30 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing the relationship 
between Congress and the Executive branch in formulating trade policy). Thus, the actions 
of Congress pertaining to trade in financial services seem inconsistent with its role in enact-
ing FBSEA. 
6. The contracting states are referred to as "Members." No general definition of 
"services" is contained in the GATS; however, "there is general agreement that it includes 
such activities as wholesale and retail trade, transportation, communications, banking, fi-
nance, insurance, business and professional services, community services (including public 
administration and defense), social services (including education and health) and personal 
services (like repair or laundry services)." Sauvant & Weber, supra note 5, at 17. 
7. The BCCI Affair: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Narcotics, and In-
ternational Operations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 
1 (1991); and 2d Sess., pts. 4-6 (1992). The first generation of "BCCI scandal" books has 
emerged. See, e.g., JAMES R. ADAMS & DouGLAS FRANTZ, A FULL SERVICE BANK: How 
BCCI STOLE BILLIONS AROUND THE WoRLD (1992); JoNATHAN BEATY & S.C. GwYNNE, 
THE OUTLAW BANK: A WILD RIDE INTO THE SECRET HEART OF BCCI (1993); NICK 
KocHNAN & BoB WHITTINGTON, BANKRUPT: THE BCCI FRAUD (1991); MARK PoTTs ET 
AL., DIRTY MoNEY BCCI: THE INSIDE STORY oF THE WoRLD's SLEAZIEST BANK (1992); 
RoBERT E. Pow1s, THE MoNEY LAUNDERERs (1992); PETER TRUELL & LARRY GuRWIN, 
FALSE PROFITS: THE INSIDE STORY OF BCCI, THE WoRLD's MosT CoRRUPT FINANCIAL 
EMPIRE (1992). 
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Round, and a number of books concerning it have come out recently.8 
There was understandable excitement when a final agreement on the 
GATS was struck covering trade in services among GATT members.9 
Such trade is worth over $900 billion annually among GATT members 
and was not covered previously by the GATT regime.10 
Until now, no one has considered the relationship between the revolu-
tion in U.S. foreign bank regulation in the aftermath of BCCI affair, on 
the one hand, and the GATS, on the other hand. Exploring this relation-
ship is particularly urgent. U.S. trade negotiators soon will begin succes-
sive rounds of negotiations, under the auspices of the GATS, aimed at the 
progressive liberalization of market access for banks and other financial 
institutions, as well as providers of other services.U 
The importance of these negotiations cannot be overemphasized. As a 
general matter, the service sector is "the most important and dynamic 
part of economic activity."12 The service sector "is now the dominant 
employer and producer of income in all developed and the majority of 
developing countries."13 Services account for more than 50 percent of 
gross domestic product {GDP) in twenty-one developed countries14 and 
twenty-five developing countries.15 With respect to banking services in 
particular, an increasingly diverse constituency of banks hold a large 
share of the world's bank assets. In 1974, banks from the Group of Ten 
(G-10) countries held ninety percent of all bank assets.16 By 1991, banks 
8. The most noteworthy is the official report of the Uruguay Round, GAIT, THE 
FINAL Acr EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL 
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Dec. 15, 1993). See also GEzA FEKETEKUTY, THE NEw TRADE 
AGENDA, GROUP OF THIRTY OCCASIONAL PAPERS 40 (1992); GAIT, THE URUGUAY 
RouND (1993); PATRICK Low, TRADING FREE THE GAIT AND U.S. TRADE PoucY 
(1993). 
9. See, e.g., Memorandum from White House to United States '!fade Representative 
(Dec. 15, 1993) on Trade Agreements Resulting from the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, 19-21, 58 Fed. Reg. 67,263 (Dec. 20, 1993) [hereinafter White House 
Memorandum]; Success!- The Most Comprehensive Round Ever Is Concluded, Focus 
(GAIT Newsletter), Dec. 1993, at 1. 
10. The Uruguay Round's Key Results, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 1993, at A6. 
11. GATS, supra note 5, at arts. XIX-XXI; White House Memorandum, supra note 9, 
at 21. 
12. Sauvant & Weber, supra note 5, at 17. 
13. !d. 
14. THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1991 (1991). These countries 
may be grouped into three categories according to the share of services in their annual 
GDP: (1) 70-79 percent-Ireland; (2) 60-69 percent-Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, United 
Kingdom, and United States; and (3) 50-59 percent-Finland, Greece, Hungary, Japan, 
Portugal, and South Africa. 
15. !d. Again, the countries may be grouped into three categories according to the 
share of services in their annual GDP: (1) 70-79 percent-Hong Kong and Panama; (2) 60-
69 percent-El Salvador, Iran, Jordan, Peru, Singapore, and Uruguay; and (3) 50-59 per-
cent-Argentina, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Congo, Egypt, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Syria, Trinidad and 
Tobago, and Thnisia. 
16. Claire Makin, Learning from BCCI, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, 93, 97 (Nov. 1991). 
The G-10 is composed of Japan and the major industrialized countries of North America 
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from the G-10 countries controlled eighty percent of the world's bank 
assets. 
In sum, the service sector is extremely important to the economies of 
newly industrialized countries (NICs) and less developed countries 
(LDCs), and an ever-greater amount of assets are maintained in accounts 
with Asian, Latin American, Middle Eastern, and African banks. As 
these banks become increasingly significant players in international fi-
nance, naturally, they will seek access to the banking markets of the U.S. 
and other G-10 countries. Legal barriers-such as those associated with 
FBSEA and revised Regulation K identified in this article-which restrict 
access do not reflect the changing status of banks from NICs and LDCs. 
The barriers are certain to be a source of heated debate at future rounds 
of GATS negotiations aimed at liberalizing market access for service 
providers. 
B. TRAGEDY AND IRONY 
There would appear to be no connections among Professor Niebuhr's 
definitions of tragedy and irony, foreign bank regulation, and the GATS. 
In fact, however, these definitions illuminate the relationship between the 
GATS and the post-BCCI legal regime applicable to foreign banks. Pro-
fessor Niebuhr's definitions help delineate why Congress's and the Fed-
eral Reserve's responses to the BCCI affair are unsatisfactoryP Their 
responses, embodied in FBSEA and revised Regulation K, reflect a 
choice of protectionism over free trade with respect to banking services. 
This is tragic. The choice is incongruous with efforts of the United States 
Trade Representative toward free trade in financial services through the 
GATS. This is ironic. 
FBSEA and revised Regulation K are tragic because, in order to pre-
vent "another BCCI," the Congress and Federal Reserve have adopted a 
distinctly protectionist stance toward foreign banks. This exemplifies 
Professor Niebuhr's identification of a tragic choice as one in which "they 
sacrifice some high value for the sake of a higher or equal one." The high 
value of free trade in financial services and free flow of capital is surren-
dered. The purportedly equal or higher value that ostensibly justifies this 
sacrifice is the goal of keeping out mischievous foreign banks. In the af-
and Western Europe: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and U.S. 
17. Professor Niebuhr's language explaining tragedy and irony is measured and pre-
cise and, therefore, worthy of application-Niebuhr himself does so in a variety of con-
texts. See, e.g., NIEBUHR, supra note 1. This is not to suggest, however, that Professor 
Niebuhr's entire theology is applicable to the issues discussed herein, and no attempt is 
made to explore the relationship between his theological perspectives and these issues. 
The application of the work of Professors Guido Calabresi & Philip Bobbit, TRAGIC 
CHOicES (1978) to foreign bank regulation is considered below. See infra notes 169-79 and 
accompanying text. Irony is the subject of a vast body of literary criticism, which is beyond 
the scope of this article. Apparently, there is no single understanding of what "irony" 
means, at least in the literary context. See, e.g., WAYNE BooTH, A RHETORIC OF IRONY ix, 
1, 6 (1974) (indicating stable irony is intentional and not explicit). 
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termath of BCCI, legislators in Congress and bank regulators at the Fed-
eral Reserve have fixed in their minds a "bad bank" model regarding 
foreign banks. Every foreign bank that seeks to gain access to the U.S. 
banking market is another potential BCCI. The tragic choice is made 
because of an underlying, unstated fear of "bad" foreign banks, particu-
larly banks from the NICs and LDCs, and a determination that "no more 
BCCis" shall occur. With this model in mind, the legislators and regula-
tors over-reacted-FBSEA and revised Regulation K make entering and 
conducting business in the United States far more difficult for foreign 
banks.18 
Further, the Congressional and Federal Reserve responses foster an 
"irony." FBSEA and revised Regulation K are not just an over-reaction 
to the BCCI affair, whose protectionist repercussions will, in time, sub-
side. They are non-tariff barriers to foreign banks that will affect the 
structure and stature of U.S. banking markets for years to come. These 
barriers can be quantified, to some extent, by considering the increased 
transaction costs faced by foreign banks seeking to penetrate the U.S. 
banking market.19 Raising non-tariff barriers to foreign banks is com-
pletely at odds with a trend in U.S. international financial policy in favor 
of free trade in financial services. This alternative trend is evidenced by 
the final GATS accord negotiated by the USTR. Indeed, President Clin-
ton recently stated that a key U.S. objective regarding trade in services 
was "to reduce or to eliminate barriers to, or other distortions of, interna-
tional trade in services, including barriers that deny national treatment 
and restrictions on establishment and operation in such markets."20 
The incongruity is not merely fortuitous. Thus, according to Niebuhr, it 
is not simply comic, but ironic. On the one hand, three provisions of 
FBSEA and revised Regulation K have distinctly protectionist effects: 
the requirement that a foreign bank apply to the Federal Reserve for 
approval before opening a branch, agency, or representative office in the 
U.S.; the mandatory standard of home-country, comprehensive, consoli-
dated supervision for evaluating applications submitted to the Federal 
Reserve; and the rule that a foreign bank take insured retail deposits 
through a U.S. subsidiary.21 On the other hand, the entire thrust of the 
18. There is no doubt that, among the bank regulators, the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System advocated FBSEA. For an overview of the legislation as it was 
initially proposed, see Danovitch & Macdonald, supra note 2, at 225-26. 
19. See infra notes 48-73 and accompanying text. 
20. White House Memorandum, supra note 9, at 19. 
21. Domestic bank holding companies and state-chartered banks that are members of 
the Federal Reserve System are, of course, subject to the Federal Reserve approval and 
examination process. See Regulation Y, 12 C.P.R. pt. 225 (1994) (governing bank holding 
companies); Regulation H, 12 C.P.R. pt. 208 (1994) (governing state member banks). 
Does FBSEA impose significantly more burdens on foreign banks that take insured retail 
deposits than the requirements for domestic banking entities? More generally, should such 
foreign banks be regulated differently than domestic banks? These questions raise the 
problem of national treatment, discussed below. See infra notes 66-73 & 83-85 and accom-
panying text. 
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GATS plainly is in the direction of free trade in financial services and 
liberalization of access for foreign banks to domestic markets. 
Tragedy and irony are not the same genre, nor are they necessarily con-
nected to each other. The essence of tragedy is the sacrifice of a value of 
fundamental importance. The sacrifice should be (though it not always 
is) readily apparent. Irony is not so obvious. Spotting an ironic condition 
requires a careful reconstruction of the intended meaning and effect of 
two (or more) laws or policies. Then, these reconstructions must be jux-
taposed and found incompatible. In other words, a clash among the re-
constructions is necessary for irony. The fact that a fundamentally 
important value is sacrificed does not suggest an irony is present. The 
fact that the intended meanings or effects of two laws conflict does not 
indicate the existence of a tragedy. Either genre can exist without the 
other. Only where the clash among reconstructed meanings or effects is 
associated with something given up or lost is there both tragedy and 
irony. Foreign bank regulation after the BCCI affair is an uncommon 
instance of both genres. 
C. No MoRE BCCis VERsus OPEN BANKING MARKETS 
Of course, arguing that foreign banks should be allowed to enter the 
U.S. with complete freedom would be irresponsible.22 An economically 
rational preference for free trade cannot wholly undermine domestic or 
international bank regulation. Commercial banks play a unique role with 
respect to monetary policy, are critically important to the payments sys-
tem, and are a mechanism for transmitting financial shocks that can lead 
to serious systemic problems. In these respects, banks-foreign or do-
mestic-are different from other commercial or industrial enterprises. 
No one wants "another BCCI." The unique features of banks, coupled 
with the aim of minimizing the likelihood of serious bank fraud, explains 
the regulatory interest in foreign banks. But, to believe that another 
BCCI lurks behind every tree is erroneous. The critical underlying issue 
is how much regulatory intervention regarding foreign banks is 
appropriate? 
This article does not attempt to formulate a general theoretical stan-
dard or policy prescription for resolving the underlying fundamental ten-
sion between the economic aim of free trade and the post-Depression era 
bank regulatory state.23 The tension is a fascinating problem of trade-offs 
in the modern global marketplace-efficiency versus safety and free 
22. As President Clinton noted, while pursuing free trade in services "taking into ac-
count legitimate U.S. domestic objectives including, but not limited to, the protection of 
legitimate health or safety, essential security, environmental, consumer or employment op-
portunity interests and the law and regulations in those areas" is also necessary. White 
House Memorandum, supra note 9, at 20. 
23. But see infra notes 168-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of a market-
based approach to tragic choices. 
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choice versus paternalism.24 The problem is not unique to banking and 
surfaces, for example, in the international trade of pharmaceuticals, pesti-
cides, and agricultural products. Remarkably, only recently has any at-
tention been given to the problem in the context of the international 
trade in banking services. 
The more modest aim of this article is to argue that FBSEA and re-
vised Regulation K err too much on the side of regulatory intervention. 
The thesis advanced herein suggests a change in the burden of proof is 
needed. Legislators and bank regulators should have to explain why for-
eign banks ought to face increased non-tariff barriers to entry. Presently, 
two burdens seem to rest on foreign banks seeking to do business in the 
U.S. First, as a class, they confront the fact that free trade in financial 
services is not the presumptive starting point of American foreign bank 
regulation. Second, each individual foreign bank is guilty until proven 
innocent and must show it is not another BCCI. 
In addressing the problem of non-tariff barriers, the Congress and Fed-
eral Reserve should show why increments in the regulation of foreign 
banks are justified on microeconomic grounds. The microeconomic argu-
ments in favor of free trade are well known and need not be repeated in 
detail here.25 The case for free trade in banking services is, in many re-
gards, based on the same argument in favor of free trade for any good or 
service: the law of comparative advantage. Foreign banks offer U.S. con-
sumers of banking services at least three obvious economic benefits: effi-
ciency, liquidity, and innovation. 
With respect to efficiency, foreign banks are able to offer services at 
lower cost than U.S. banks. For example, foreign banks in the U.S. are 
particularly skilled at lending to middle-market companies who seek ex-
port financing.26 This seems to result from better quality services at 
lower prices.27 The fact that foreign banks excel in certain market niches 
leads to an important related benefit for Americans: employment. Over 
300,000 U.S. bankers and related workers are employed by foreign bank 
operations in the u.s.zs 
In addition, foreign banks currently hold $862 billion of assets, or 22 
24. For a discussion of the problem, see RAJ BHALA, THE UNFINISHED BusiNESS OF 
THE URUGUAY RouND OF THE GATT (forthcoming, manuscript on file with author). 
25. See MELVYN KRAuss, THE NEw PROTECfiONISM 1-4 (1978). 
26. See, e.g., Lori Ioannou, Friendly Invaders - Foreign Banks Score Big with U.S. 
Companies, lNT'L Bus., Nov. 1992, at 29. 
27. For example, a foreign bank branch or agency located in the U.S. can issue letters 
of credit for an account party in the U.S. such as an American importer. Suppose the 
beneficiary of the letter of credit is an exporter located in the home-country of the foreign 
bank. Then, the home office of that bank conveniently can serve as the confirming bank 
for the beneficiary. There may be cost advantages to this arrangement. The letter of credit 
fee charged to the account party may be cheaper where the same foreign bank issues and 
confirms the credit than where two independent banks are involved. Of course, there may 
be quality advantages to this arrangement as well. 
28. James R. Kraus, Foreign Banks: Major Players in the U.S., AM. BANKER, Sept. 21, 
1993, at 13. 
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percent of all bank assets in the U.S.29 They account for 45 percent of all 
loans extended to U.S. businesses.30 They are, therefore, a significant 
source of liquidity in the U.S. banking market, as Alan Greenspan, Chair-
man of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, readily 
admits: 
The liquidity and depth of the U.S. banking environment has to a 
great extent been made possible by the participation of foreign 
banks. The active presence of foreign banks in this country has 
helped to assure the continued importance of the United States in 
international financial markets. Of equal significance, foreign banks 
have been a substantial source of credit for all types of American 
businesses in all parts of this country. 
It is clear that foreign banks occupy an important and growing 
place among banking institutions in the United States.31 
Foreign banks are a source of innovation, bringing new financial tech-
niques and technologies to the U.S. market. They are known for provid-
ing innovative products and implementing sophisticated trading strategies 
originally developed in their home-country markets.32 In turn, they serve 
as a critical competitive stimulus to U.S. banks. 
In sum, the law of comparative advantage suggests that we hurt our-
selves when we deny market access to foreign banks or make their entry 
into the U.S. significantly more difficult. Yet, conventional economic wis-
dom is not the only microeconomic reason why the burden of justifying 
incremental regulations should be on the bank regulators and not the reg-
ulated foreign banks. Free trade in banking services is a value worth pre-
serving because it promotes efficiency in international financial markets. 
Ensuring that capital flows freely across borders into the most productive, 
highest yielding investments is important. This flow is facilitated if the 
purveyors of capital-the banks-are allowed to open offices in different 
countries with relative ease. Conversely, denying foreign banks access to 
a domestic market can induce a "credit crunch" in that market. These 
benefits of an open banking market have been sacrificed by the post-
BCCI international banking legislation and regulation. 
29. I d. This statistic is as of the year ending Dec. 31, 1992. See also Henry Terrell, U.S. 
Branches and Agencies of Foreign Banks: A New Look, 79 FED. REs. BuLL. 913, t. 3, at 
919 (Oct. 1993) (reporting that, as of March 31, 1993, foreign bank branches and agencies 
held $683.1 billion of assets, amounting to 18% of all assets held by banks in the U.S.). 
30. This statistic is for 1991. James R. Kraus, U.S. Banks Fighting Plan to Curb For-
eign Institutions, AM. BANKER, Nov. 30, 1992, at 2. See also Terrell, supra note 29, at 920 
(reporting a figure of 42%, as of March 31, 1993). 
31. Regulation of Foreign Banks: Hearing before the House Comm. on Banking, Fi-
nance and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (June 11, 1991) (testimony of Alan Green-
span, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (emphasis supplied). 
32. Beverly Hirtle, Factors Affecting the Competitiveness of Internationally Active Fi-
nancial Institutions, 16 FED. REs. BANK N.Y. Q. REv. 38 (Spring 1991). 
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II. THE SETTING 
A. INTRODUCING MAHARAJAH BANK 
To articulate the thesis that FBSEA and revised Regulation K are 
tragic and ironic, in Niebuhr's sense of these terms, consider a hypotheti-
cal foreign enterprise-the Maharajah Bank Holding Company. This 
holding company is incorporated in Bombay, India; its principal bank 
subsidiary, which is its principal asset, is the Maharajah Bank. Maharajah 
Bank is incorporated in Bombay, India, but its principal place of business 
is Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Maharajah Bank has branches throughout 
South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East and specializes in serv~ 
ing the need of expatriate Indian communities to repatriate funds. Over-
seas Indian workers, called non-resident Indians (NRis), deposit their 
wages and other earnings in their local Maharajah Bank branch. The 
NRis instruct the branch to transmit some of the deposited funds to their 
families back home in India. 
Maharajah Bank has aspirations of becoming a truly global bank and 
must, therefore, open a branch, agency, or representative office in major 
financial centers, namely, New York, London, and Tokyo. Market re-
search indicates that there is a large NRI community in the New York 
metropolitan area. Thus, eventually Maharajah Bank would like to ac-
cept federally insured retail deposits from New York NRis to service 
their repatriation needs. Maharajah Bank's efforts to enter the U.S. 
banking market are the focus of this article. 
Maharajah Bank's India operations are regulated by the Reserve Bank 
of India (the Indian central bank and regulatory authority). In Malaysia, 
Maharajah Bank's activities are regulated by Bank Negara {the Malay-
sian central bank and regulatory authority). Whether either of these au-
thorities regulates Maharajah Bank on a comprehensive, consolidated 
basis is not clear.33 
B. THE Acrs 
There are four remaining parts to this article-three Acts and a Con-
clusion. The scene is set at the beginning of each Act. In the first scene, 
Maharajah Bank applies to bank regulatory authorities for permission to 
open a branch, agency, or representative office in the U.S. Act I argues 
that the new entry requirements established by FBSEA serve as non-
tariff barriers to the establishment of foreign bank offices in the United 
States. They represent a significant increase in transaction costs that for-
eign banks must incur if they are to do business in the U.S. They also 
serve as a latent capital control. There is an incongruity between these 
requirements and Articles VI, XVII, and XIX of the GATS, which con-
cern domestic regulation, national treatment, and progressive liberaliza-
tion of market access, respectively. 
33. See infra notes 92-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of comprehensive 
consolidated regulation. 
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The scene in Act II is the evaluation of the application of Maharajah 
Bank by bank regulatory authorities. Act II argues that the standards for 
approving foreign bank applications may serve as non-tariff barriers to 
market access. The requirement that a foreign bank be supervised in a 
comprehensive, consolidated manner by its home-country regulator 
raises concerns of discrimination against banks from NICs and LDCs and 
is potentially incongruous with Articles III and IV of the GATS. These 
pertain to transparency and increasing the participation of developing 
countries, respectively. 
The scene of Act III assumes Maharajah Bank's application eventually 
is approved. In this scene, Maharajah Bank attempts to enter the retail-
deposit taking business in the U.S. Act III argues that the deposit insur-
ance requirement also serves as a non-tariff barrier to trade which, like 
the new entry requirement, is a significant increase in the transaction 
costs faced by foreign banks that seek to do business in the U.S. The 
deposit insurance requirement is incongruous with Article XVI:2( e) of 
the GATS, which relates to market access commitmen~s and impermissi-
ble legal measures, and also is incongruous with the domestic regulation 
provision of Article VI of the GATS. 
After the scene is set, each act proceeds in three structured steps. First, 
what are the new rules governing Maharajah Bank? Second, why are 
these rules tragic? Third, why are these rules ironic? The inquiry in step 
one focuses on what new rules are established by FBSEA and the revi-
sions to Regulation K and how these rules contrast with the pre-BCCI 
legal regime. Step two shows how they act as non-tariff barriers, thereby 
highlighting the tragic element of the post-BCCI legal regime for foreign 
banks by evincing the choice made by U.S. legislators and bank regula-
tors in favor of protectionism. Step three establishes the ironic aspect of 
the rules by exploring the contrasts between these rules and various pro-
visions of the GATS. The deliberate incongruities of GATS, on the one 
hand, with FBSEA and revised Regulation K, on the other hand, are de-
lineated in this step. This is the ironic element of the post-BCCI legal 
regime-it has and appears likely to continue to limit foreign bank access 
to U.S. markets in spite of the GATS. 
In the Conclusion, modest proposals about how to rectify the deliber-
ate incongruities are offered. They are based on the work of Professors 
Calabresi and Bobbit concerning tragic choices about scarce goods and 
resources. What is suggested is that a more market-driven scheme for 
determining foreign bank entry might be appropriate. 
One preliminary caveat should be offered. To distinguish the identifi-
cation of incongruities, on the one hand, and the existence of outright 
violations of the GATS, on the other hand, is critical. FBSEA was en-
acted, and Regulation K was revised, before agreement on the final text 
of the GATS was achieved. Only if the GATS is applied retroactively can 
such violations be legitimately alleged. Another potential violation com-
mitted by the U.S. arises under the international law of treaties. Under 
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this body of law, a country that has signed an agreement or otherwise 
expressed its consent to be bound by an agreement must refrain from acts 
that would defeat the object and purpose of the agreement.34 A coun-
try's obligation to refrain from defeating the object of a treaty is triggered 
as soon as the country agrees to become bound by the treaty, even if the 
treaty has not yet entered into force. When FBSEA was enacted and the 
revisions to Regulation K were promulgated, the U.S. had not expressed 
its consent to be bound by the GATS. Thus, technically, the U.S. did not 
violate its international treaty law obligation. But, an argument could be 
made that the U.S. did not act in good faith when participating in the 
GATS negotiations because it passed protectionist banking rules contem-
poraneously with these negotiations. 
III. ACf 1: APPLYING TO GET IN 
THE SCENE 
Enter Maharajah Bank and the Federal Reserve. Maharajah Bank 
wants a physical presence in New York and has the option of opening a 
federally- or state-licensed branch or agency in New York. Alternatively, 
the bank could commence operations in the form of a representative of-
fice in the U.S. Regardless of which option Maharajah Bank chooses, it 
faces an alarming barrier: the Federal Reserve licensing requirement. 
A. FEDERAL RESERVE LICENSING 
FBSEA substantially enhances the power of the Federal Reserve to 
determine which foreign banks can and cannot enter the U.S. and to ex-
amine those that are allowed to enter. The legal mechanism that leads to 
this result is the application process. A foreign bank like Maharajah 
Bank must obtain licenses to enter the United States. To get the licenses, 
a foreign bank must file applications that meet all statutory and regula-
tory requirements. 
No foreign bank can establish35 a branch or agency36 without the prior 
34. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 18, U.N. Doc. N 
CONF. 39/27, 63 A.J.I.L. 875, 8 I.L.M. 679, entered into force, Jan. 27, 1980 (the United 
States is a party to the Vienna Convention); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FoREIGN RE-
LATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 312(3) (1987). 
35. "Establish" means more than just the de novo opening of a branch, agency, or 
representative office in the U.S., also covering four other types of transactions: (1) merg-
ing two foreign banks, at least one of which has U.S. offices, where those offices are as-
sumed by the combined entity after the merger; (2) upgrading the status of a U.S. office by, 
for example, converting a representative office to an agency or branch; (3) relocating a 
foreign bank's U.S. office from one state to another; and (4) acquiring an office by acquir-
ing a subsidiary where the subsidiary would not operate in the same corporate form after 
the acquisition. Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. § 211.22(k)(2)-(5) (1993). Because of the broad 
meaning of "establish," the Federal Reserve licensing requirement acts as a non-tariff bar-
rier in a broad number of prospective transactions, even those that are changes in form 
rather than substance. 
36. In contrast to a subsidiary of a foreign bank. a branch or agency of a foreign bank 
does not have assets that are independent of the parent foreign bank. Neither a branch 
nor an agency is a separately capitalized, free-standing legal entity. Branches are author-
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approval of the Federal Reserve.37 For the first time in its history, the 
Federal Reserve is cast in the role of a "licensing agency," with respect to 
foreign bank branches and agencies.38 The Federal Reserve must now 
ized to engage in a broader range of banking activities than agencies (or representative 
offices). 
A "branch" can receive deposits, make loans, and undertake general banking functions. 
An "agency" is not permitted to take deposits from U.S. citizens or residents. Thus, agen-
cies are used by foreign banks interested primarily in wholesale banking. Agencies of for-
eign banks are active in lending, paying checks, and maintaining "credit balances." 
The key legal distinction between branches and agencies concerns credit balances. 
These are "active balances that arise from or are incident to transactions involving loans, 
funds in transition, letters of credit, and other identifiable events." Dennis J. Lehr & Cam-
eron F. MacRae, Ill, Foreign Banks in the United States: Acquisitions, Branching, and 
Other Techniques, 3 J. CaMP. CoRP. L. & SEc. REG. 202, 203 {1981) [hereinafter Lehr & 
MacRae]. Credit balances are "incidental to, or arise out of the exercise of, other lawful 
banking powers," "serve a specific purpose," are "not solicited from the general public," 
"nor used to pay routine operating expenses in the United States such as salaries, rent, or 
taxes," are "withdrawn within a reasonable period of time" after their specific purpose has 
been accomplished, and "drawn upon in a manner reasonable in relation to the size and 
nature of the account." Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. § 211.22{b){1)-{6) {1993). The straight-
forward test for distinguishing a credit balance from a deposit is that the holder of a credit 
balance cannot add to it, whereas the holder of a deposit account can add to the account by 
depositing additional funds. Lehr & MacRae, supra, at 203. 
A second, more practical distinction between a branch and agency pertains to funding. 
An agency, unlike a branch, cannot take deposits and must, therefore, fund its operations 
from other sources. Agencies have three principal sources of funds: borrowing from the 
parent banking organization, borrowing in the inter-bank market (i.e., from other banks), 
and borrowing through money market transactions (e.g., issuing short-term certificates of 
deposit, entering into overnight repurchase agreements, etc.). See Regulation of Foreign 
Banks: Hearing before House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 
1st Sess. 91 {1991) (statement of Vincent Conlon, Acting Superintendent of Banking, New 
York State Banking Department). 
37. 12 U.S.C. § 3105{d){l) (Supp. IV 1992); Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. § 211.24(a){1){A) 
{1993). This is an amendment to§ 7{d){l) of the International Banking Act of 1978 (IBA). 
The regulatory scheme for establishing a subsidiary bank in the u:s. is not affected by 
FBSEA. Prior approval must be obtained from the Federal Reserve under the Bank Hold-
ing Company Act "for any action ... that causes any company to become a bank holding 
company." 12 U.S.C. § 1842{a) (1988). See also 12 U.S.C. § 3106(a) (Supp. IV 1992). The 
requirements of the state in which the bank is incorporated also must be satisfied. 
Revised Regulation K calls for prior approval in transactions where only the corporate 
form of the subsidiary changes to avoid an overlap with approval under the Bank Holding 
Company Act in cases where the acquired subsidiary maintains the same corporate form 
after the acquisition. Under the Bank Holding Company Act, the U.S. offices of the sub-
sidiary bank would be subject to regulatory scrutiny. Where the corporate form of the 
subsidiary changes after the acquisition, an independent basis for regulatory scrutiny is 
needed. This basis is provided by revised Regulation K. The logic is that where the corpo-
rate form of the acquired subsidiary changes, new U.S. offices are, in effect, established. 
38. The use of the term "licensing" in connection with the Federal Reserve approval 
process may be met with some objections. Certainly, the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) and state regulators insist that "[I]icensing remains in the hands of state 
banking regulators for state licensed banks and with the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency for federally licensed banks." James R. Kraus, N.Y. Regulator to Retain Foreign-
Bank Oversight, AM. BANKER, Apr. 22, 1992, at 7. In a letter to all state-licensed foreign 
bank branches and agencies in New York, Derrick D. Cephas, Superintendent, New York 
State Banking Department, resolutely declared that "[t]he New York State Banking De-
partment remains the principal licensing authority for transnational banks .... The Federal 
Reserve Board is not and, going forward, will not be, a licensing authority." /d. Nonethe-
less, the term "licensing" seems applicable in a broad sense. The Federal Reserve has final 
decision-making authority over foreign bank entry. 
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weed out and deny entry to the U.S. not only "potential BCCis," but also 
foreign bank applicants that are weakly capitalized, badly managed, or 
poorly supervised.39 
For Maharajah Bank, the licensing requirement is deceptively simple. 
There are actually three levels of bureaucracy that Maharajah Bank must 
penetrate. Requiring receipt of Federal Reserve approval before operat-
ing in the U.S. imposes a dual burden. This is because applications are 
reviewed at two different levels in the Federal Reserve: the Federal Re-
serve Bank in the district in which the foreign bank proposes to operate, 
and the Board of Governors in Washington, D.C.40 Thus, two of the bu-
reaucratic levels are within the Federal Reserve system itself-the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of New York and the Board of Governors. 
To be sure, this regime does not differ from the one applicable to do-
mestic banks, which also must traverse through two levels of Federal Re-
serve bureaucracy. What has never been clearly established is why two 
levels of review are needed in the domestic or international context. Sup-
pose the Board of Governors approves virtually all Reserve Bank appli-
cation recommendations. Then, why bother with this "rubber stamp"? If 
the Board of Governors has ultimate decision-making authority, but fails 
to exercise it in practice, then its review of applications is superfluous. 
Suppose, on the other hand, the Board of Governors aggressively reviews 
Reserve Bank recommendations and alters a large percentage of them. 
Then, what is the point of the Reserve Bank level review? If the Board 
of Governors routinely exercises its decision-making authority, then Re-
serve Bank review is superfluous. 
The third level of application review is a legacy from the pre-BCCI 
legal regime. The Federal Reserve licensing requirement is in addition to 
(not in lieu of) licensing requirements imposed by the OCC and state 
bank regulators. The licensing requirements of these other government 
agencies existed before FBSEA was enacted and Regulation K revisions 
were promulgated and remain in force. Hence, the post-BCCI legal re-
gime has three "regulatory hoops" through which a foreign bank appli-
cant, such as Maharajah Bank, must "jump" before opening a branch or 
agency in the U.S.: the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Federal 
Reserve Board, and (depending on whether Maharajah Bank files a fed-
eral or state application) the OCC or state banking regulator. 
Thus, the requirement of filing an application with the Federal Reserve 
does not replace the requirement of first seeking approval from the OCC 
39. Regulation of Foreign Banks: Hearing before House Comm. on Banking, Finance, 
and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1991), reprinted in 77 FED. REs. BuLL. 644, 
645 (1991) (prepared statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, indicating the Federal Reserve intended to prevent weak foreign 
banks from entering the U.S.). 
40. James R. Kraus, Fed Moves to Reduce Delays on Foreign Bank Applications, AM. 
BANKER, Mar. 12, 1993, at 2. 
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or appropriate state bank regulator to establish a branch or agency.41 If 
Maharajah Bank seeks to establish a federal branch or agency, then it 
must obtain a license from the OCC.42 This is true whether or not Maha-
rajah Bank already operates a branch or agency in the U.S. To be sure, 
the Federal Reserve licensing requirement is more significant. The OCC 
cannot approve a foreign bank's application to establish a federal agency 
or branch in the U.S. unless conditions imposed by the Federal Reserve 
are included. 43 
In order to establish a state branch or agency, Maharajah Bank must 
get a license from the state banking regulator where it proposes to oper-
ate-the New York State Banking Department. Here too, a Federal Re-
serve license is needed, regardless of the fact that a state bank regulator 
has granted a state license.44 The Federal Reserve has the upper hand 
with respect to the imposition of conditions. Moreover, it is not bound by 
views that may be expressed by the state bank regulator regarding Maha-
rajah Bank's application. 
Federal Reserve approval also is necessary if Maharajah Bank seeks to 
open a representative office.45 Under the pre-BCCI legal regime, no reg-
41. 12 U.S.C. § 3102(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1992). See also Sivon, supra note 2. In the do-
mestic bank regulatory context, an entity seeking to become a bank holding company must 
file an application with the Federal Reserve under the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 
U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850,1971-1978 (1988). A bank owned by a bank holding company has one 
primary federal regulator. For national banks, that regulator is the OCC. For state-
chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System, the primary federal 
regulator is the Federal Reserve. Finally, for state-chartered non-member banks, the pri-
mary federal regulator is the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. In contrast, under 
FBSEA, a federal branch or agency of a single foreign bank effectively has two primary 
federal regulators-the Federal Reserve and the OCC. Thus, the argument can be made 
that FBSEA represents an increased regulatory burden on foreign relative to domestic 
banks. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. 
42. The IBA forbids the OCC from approving the establishment of a federal branch or 
agency if the law of the state in which the branch or agency would operate prohibits foreign 
banks from establishing branches and agencies. 12 U.S.C. § 3102(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1992). 
This requirement is necessary to preserve the integrity of the McFadden Act of 1927, which 
prohibits national banks from establishing a branch in a state unless the law of that state 
allows a state bank to establish a branch in that state. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1988). As a 
result, foreign banks are on a competitively equal position with U.S. banks that have na-
tional or state charters. 
43. 12 U.S.C. § 3102(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1992). Under 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(5) (Supp. IV 
1992), the Federal Reserve is authorized to impose conditions upon approval of a foreign 
bank's application to establish a U.S. agency or branch. See also 12 U.S.C. § 3102(h)(1)-
(2) (Supp. IV 1992), which requires the OCC to provide the Federal Reserve with the 
opportunity to comment on a foreign bank application to establish a federal branch or 
agency in cases where the bank already operates a branch or agency in the U.S. For a 
discussion of conditions imposed by the Federal Reserve under the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act (12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850, 1971-1978 (1988)), see Alfred C. Amen, Jr., Note, Bar-
gaining for Justice: An Examination of the Use and Limits of Conditions by the Federal 
Reserve Board, 74 IowA L. REv. 837 (1989). 
44. 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1992). See also Sivon, supra note 2. When con-
sidering an application, the Federal Reserve is supposed to consider the views of the state 
regulator. 12 U.S.C. § 3105(g) (Supp. IV 1992). 
45. A "representative office" is anything other than a branch, agency, or subsidiary of 
a foreign bank and is part of the parent foreign bank, not a separately capitalized and 
distinct legal entity. This makes a representative office similar to a branch or agency and 
different from a subsidiary. 
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ulatory approval was needed. A foreign bank needed only to register its 
representative office with the Department of the Treasury.46 The right to 
register a representative office could not be denied. FBSEA and revised 
Regulation K impose the same Federal Reserve licensing requirement on 
foreign banks seeking to open a representative office as those hoping to 
establish a branch or agency. This is despite the fact that a representative 
office cannot engage in any substantive banking functions.47 Why impose 
such a requirement on innocuous entities? 
B. THE TRAGEDY: TRANSACTION CosTs 
In analyzing Maharajah Bank's application, a bank regulatory author-
ity should seek to strike an appropriate balance between achieving an 
adequate level of comfort with a foreign bank applicant and discouraging 
inappropriate foreign bank entry. Each marginal increase in the length, 
complexity, or intricacy of the regulatory application process leads to a 
marginal decrease in the openness of U.S. banking markets to foreign 
banks. In turn, Maharajah Bank's ability to establish a physical presence 
in the U.S. will be less likely. FBSEA and revised Regulation K fail to 
strike the right balance. The Federal Reserve licensing requirement is a 
marginal increase in the non-tariff barriers against foreign banks, is at 
odds with the principle of national treatment, and imposes unacceptably 
high transaction costs on foreign banks. 
Between six and fourteen percent of a foreign (or domestic) bank's 
non-interest expense is devoted to complying with government regula-
tions.48 The Federal Reserve licensing requirement for foreign banks ma-
terially increases this cost for foreign banks. Therefore, Maharajah Bank 
(assuming its application is approved) will have to recoup this cost by 
earning additional revenues; if its activities do not generate such reve-
nues, then its U.S. operation is less efficient. The return on the capital 
investment made by Maharajah Bank in its U.S. branch, agency, or repre-
sentative office is reduced, and the U.S. operation is less competitive rela-
Unlike the other forms of foreign bank organization, however, the powers of representa-
tive offices are tightly circumscribed by regulation. Representative offices cannot perform 
any basic banking activities, such as taking deposits, maintaining credit balances, extending 
loans, providing payments services, or making business decisions for the foreign bank they 
represent. Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. § 211.22(u) (1993). See also 12 C.F.R. § 250.141 (1993) 
(listing activities that do not constitute lending money). In practice, representative offices 
provide marketing and logistical support for the parent foreign bank, solicit new business, 
generate loans booked in affiliated agencies, branches, subsidiaries, or offshore offices, and 
serve as liaisons between the parent foreign bank and correspondent banks. A correspon-
dent bank is simply a bank at which the foreign bank maintains an account. 
46. 12 U.S.C. § 3107(a) (Supp. II 1990) and 31 C.F.R. § 123.3 (1990). Under the Treas-
ury's regulations, the permissible activities of a representative office were described as: 
"representational functions common to a banking business such as, without limitation, so-
licitation of new business, loan production, liaison between the bank's head office and 
correspondent banks in the United States, [and) customer relations." 31 C.F.R. § 123.2(a) 
(1990). 
47. See supra note 45. 
48. David T. Johannesen & Sara C. Settembrini, Comment, The Best of All Regulators: 
A Well-Informed Marketplace, AM. BANKER, June 4, 1993, at 4. 
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tive to domestic banks.49 In sum, there has been a marked increase in the 
transaction costs-the time, effort, and money-associated with estab-
lishing a foreign bank presence in the United States. This is a clear, quan-
tifiable manifestation of the non-tariff barrier erected by FBSEA against 
foreign banks, a barrier Maharajah Bank must evaluate.50 
1. Delays 
There is little doubt from the evidence heretofore available that the 
Federal Reserve is "microprocessing" applications, thereby causing out-
rageously long delays. Maharajah Bank does not simply drop an applica-
tion to open a branch or agency in the mail and receive a license back a 
few weeks later. A successful application takes up to two years to pro-
cess. In virtually every case, the Federal Reserve returns applications and 
requests additional information51 and will inquire about all aspects of the 
world-wide operations of even well-known foreign banks.52 Foreign bank 
applicants are compelled to prepare a voluminous amount of detailed in-
formation for the Federal Reserve to sift through. Not surprisingly, as of 
April1993-almost two and a half years after FBSEA was enacted-the 
Federal Reserve had approved only three foreign bank applications.53 
Unfortunately, unsuccessful foreign bank applicants cannot look for-
ward to a clear, formal, and final rejection from the Federal Reserve. 
Rather, they often withdraw their application after incessant questioning 
and requests for documentary material. In other words, the Federal Re-
serve says "yes" to a few foreign banks after one or two years, but does 
49. See Serge Bellanger, Stormy Weather: The FBSEA 's Impact on Foreign Banks, 25 
BANKERS MAo. 7, 11 (Nov.-Dec. 1992); Sivon, supra note 2. 
50. See James R. Kraus, Ernst Execs See Foreign Banks Eyeing Reduction of Opera-
tions in the U.S., AM. BANKER, Oct. 19, 1993, at 8 (stating that increasingly burdensome 
regulations attributable to FBSEA have added costs and caused many banks to reconsider 
their U.S. operations). 
51. See, e.g., James R. Kraus, Fed's Delay on Foreign Banks Angers States, AM. 
BANKER, Feb. 5, 1993, at 1 [hereinafter Kraus, Fed's Delay]. 
52. See, e.g., Richard Layne, Fed Tougher on Investments from Abroad, AM. BANKER, 
Apr. 10, 1992, at 1 (indicating that "[f]oreign banks that want to acquire, invest, or expand 
must be prepared to answer scores of questions on their worldwide operations"). As the 
chairman of National Westminster Bancorp (the U.S. subsidiary of the major multinational 
British bank) remarked, "BCCI caused us problems. . . . We have to explain what the 
parent company does around the world when we want to buy three branches in Queens 
[New York City]." /d. (quoting John Thgwell, Chairman, National Westminster Bancorp). 
53. These were submitted by two Taiwanese banks (Taipei Bank and United World 
Chinese Commercial Bank) to open state-licensed branches in Los Angeles, and a Spanish 
bank. See James R. Kraus, Foreign Banks Face Hurdles, AM. BANKER, Apr. 19, 1993, at 
2A; Kraus, Fed's Delay, supra note 51, at 1; James R. Kraus, A First: Fed Approves Taiwan 
Banks' Units, AM. BANKER, Dec. 22, 1992, at 10. Also, as of April 1993, nine applications 
of foreign banks have been approved by the Florida Department of Banking and Finance, 
but remain pending at the Federal Reserve. Four California applications need Federal 
Reserve approval. Three applications have been approved by the New York Banking De-
partment and await Federal Reserve action {including an application from Banco Nacional 
de Mexico, the biggest bank in Mexico). Kraus, Fed's Delay, supra note 51, at 1. See infra 
notes 58-59 and accompanying text regarding the Federal Reserve's subsequent approval 
of two of the California applications. 
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not say "no" to the majority of foreign banks, inevitably winning a war of 
attrition against the majority. 
One of the reasons for delays at the Federal Reserve in processing for-
eign bank applications is "name checks."54 Before approving Maharajah 
Bank's application for a license, every officer, director, and principal 
shareholder of the Bank must be scrutinized to determine whether she 
possesses the character, integrity, and fitness to operate a branch, agency, 
or representative office in New York. A primary goal of the inquiry is to 
make sure that none of these individuals is acting as a nominee or "front 
person" for another individual or organization. The Federal Reserve is 
fearful of this scenario because it occurred in the BCCI case. Kamal Ad-
ham, the former director of Saudi Arabia's central intelligence agency, 
Faisal Saud Al-Fulaij, the former chairman of Kuwaiti Airways, Ali Mo-
hammad Shorafa, the former director of presidential affairs for the 
United Arab Emirate of Abu Dhabi, Humaid Bin Rashid AI Naomi, the 
ruler of the United Arab Emirate of Ajman, and a host of other wealthy 
and well-connected Middle Easterners acted for BCCI as nominee share-
holders of Credit and Commerce American Holdings, N.Y. (CCAH), the 
top-tier holding company of the First American banks.55 
The problem is that there are no time limits for completion of this 
name check. Delays of more than a year are not uncommon.56 Name 
checks involve a number of U.S. governmental and international agen-
cies. The Federal Reserve passes the names of individuals associated with 
the foreign bank to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department 
of State, U.S. Customs Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
and Interpol so that these agencies may check the names against their 
records. As yet, there is no central database for this information. In the 
absence of a central database, performing name checks efficiently re-
quires an extraordinary amount of synchronization and cooperation, a 
task that is practically impossible for governmental bureaucracies. 
Recent Federal Reserve efforts to accelerate the foreign bank applica-
tion process have proved futile. 57 Approved applications trickle out of 
54. See BHALA, supra note 3, at ch. IV (discussing discretionary standards of approval 
and managerial resources). 
55. In re BCCl Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A. Luxembourg, Before the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System, Docket Nos. 91-043-CMP-FHC et seq., July 29, 1991, 
at 2, 21-22, 29-58 [hereinafter July 29, 1991 Federal Reserve Order]. 
56. See Gary M. Welsh, Unshackle Foreign Banks, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1993, at A20. 
57. See Fed Speeds Up Foreign Bank Application Process Under FBSEA, 60 Banking 
Rep. (BNA) 332 (Mar. 15, 1993). William Ryback, the associate director of the Federal 
Reserve's Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation in Washington, D.C., told for-
eign bankers that "[a]s we move forward, this approval process will be as painless as possi-
ble." Quoted in Fed's Interim Rule May Result in Some Foreign Banks Choosing to Bypass 
the U.S., Banking Daily (BNA), Apr. 30, 1992, at 2. Mr. Ryback later admitted, however, 
that he "lied" when he promised the Federal Reserve would accelerate the foreign bank 
application process: 
The usually reticent Federal Reserve Board is admitting a mistake. A key 
Fed staffer said last week that his division failed to make good on a promise 
to speed up processing of foreign bank applications. 
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the Federal Reserve at a snail's pace. Over two years were required for 
Dah Sing Bank, Hong Kong, to establish a federally-licensed branch in 
California.58 KorAm Bank, Seoul, Korea, spent fourteen months secur-
ing a Federal Reserve license to establish a federal branch in Los Ange-
les.59 Similarly, the Federal Reserve granted a license to Banco de Chile, 
Santiago, Chile, to establish a state-licensed agency in Miami after study-
ing that bank's application for thirteen months.6° 
The new procedures are ineffectual because they do not address the 
fundamental problems inherent to the system. For instance, while review 
of applications by regional Federal Reserve Bank officials and Federal 
Reserve Board officials now is supposed to take place simultaneously, 
instead of sequentially, the basic question of why a review is needed at 
each level is not addressed. Review at one of these levels should be elim-
inated. Moreover, why the Federal Reserve has not been required to em-
ploy fairly evident techniques for counteracting agency delay is puzzling. 
One such technique is to allow an affected party to proceed if the agency 
has not taken a final action within a certain period of time. Thus, a for-
eign bank applicant could be permitted to open a branch, agency, or rep-
"I know I promised, but I lied," associate director William A. Ryback told 
those attending a meeting of the Institute of International Bankers. In June, 
he pledged to clear up an application backlog "within 30 days." 
Processing stalled last November in the wake of a new banking law. Mr. 
Ryback, who is in charge of implementing the Foreign Bank Supervision En-
hancement Act, gave irate bankers little hope that things would speed up 
soon. 
James R. Kraus, Read Fed's Lips, AM. BANKER, Oct. 21, 1992, at 2. See also James R. 
Kraus, Fed Set to Tackle Backlog of Foreign Applications, AM. BANKER, May 20, 1992, at 
10. 
58. On Dec. 16, 1993, the Federal Reserve announced approval of the application of 
Dah Sing Bank, Hong Kong, to establish a federally-licensed branch in California. Federal 
Reserve System, Order Approving Establishment of a Branch, Dah Sing Bank, Ltd., Hong 
Kong, Dec. 16, 1993. The notice of this application was published on Sept. 20, 1991. ld. at 
1. 
Publication of a notice "in a newspaper of general circulation in the community in which 
the applicant proposes to engage in business" is an additional burden imposed on each 
foreign bank applicant seeking to establish a branch or agency in the U.S. 12 C.F.R. 
§ 211.24(b)(2) (1993). The notice must state a Federal Reserve application has been sub-
mitted and that anyone may provide comments on the application. 12 C.F.R. 
211.24(b)(2)(i) (1993). Any person is entitled to submit comments. 12 C.F.R. 
§ 211.24(b)(3) (1993). This is an unnecessary transaction cost imposed on foreign banks. 
While the requirement serves the public policy purpose of informing the public of a foreign 
bank's plan to open an office, the Federal Reserve could easily publish a notice in the 
Federal Register or the Federal Reserve Bulletin listing all foreign bank applications sub-
mitted and the date by which public comments must be received, thereby removing the 
burden from the foreign bank applicant. Persons interested in these applications are more 
likely to follow foreign banking developments through these publications than a local 
newspaper. 
59. Notice was published on October 13, 1992 and approval was not obtained until 
December 22, 1993. Federal Reserve System, Order Approving the Establishment of a 
Branch, KorAm Bank, Seoul, Korea, Dec. 22, 1993, at 1. 
60. The application of Banco de Chile, Santiago, Chile, to establish a state-licensed 
agency in Miami was approved on Dec. 16, 1993. Federal Reserve System, Order Approv-
ing the Establishment of an Agency, Banco de Chile, Santiago, Chile, Dec. 16, 1993. The 
notice of this application was published on Nov. 2, 1992. Id. at 1. 
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resentative office if the Federal Reserve fails to make a final 
determination on the application within a set period. To preserve the 
intent of this sort of rule, the availability of extensions of time for the 
Federal Reserve to act should be severely limited. 
2. Fees 
Delays are not the only form of transaction cost. Before FBSEA was 
enacted and the revisions to Regulation K were promulgated, a foreign 
bank typically spent $15,000 to $20,000 in legal fees in connection with an 
application to a federal or state regulator to open an office in the United 
States.61 Since that time, the cost has risen to between $50,000 and 
$75,000.62 The reason for the skyrocketing legal fees is obvious: the costs 
associated with the duplication of effort in obtaining approval from the 
Federal Reserve, as well as the OCC or state bank regulator. 
In addition to legal fees, Maharajah Bank will likely face other mone-
tary transaction costs as a result of the delays in processing applications, 
such as rent for new office space and salaries to new personnel. The 
Chiao Tung Bank (CTB), a Taiwanese bank, is a case in point. CTB ob-
tained a license from the New York State Banking Department to open a 
state agency in early 1992.63 More than a year later, the Federal Reserve 
had not approved CTB's application.64 CTB leased office space in Man-
hattan and sent staff from Taiwan to New York in late 1991. Neither 
premises nor personnel can be employed profitably until the Federal Re-
serve grants a license.65 Plainly, to minimize these sorts of transaction 
costs, Maharajah Bank will have to consider delaying the procurement of 
office space and employees in the U.S. until a Federal Reserve license is 
in hand. 
3. National Treatment 
Transaction costs are not the only reason the Federal Reserve licensing 
requirement reflects a tragic choice of protectionism. The requirement 
that foreign banks like Maharajah Bank obtain a Federal Reserve license 
before establishing a branch, agency, or representative office in the U.S. 
undermines the principle of national treatment in the International Bank-
ing Act of 1978 (IBA).66 According to that principle, foreign banks 
61. Kraus, Fed's Delay, supra note 51, at 1. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. ld. The application finally was approved by the Federal Reserve on March 18, 
1993. Federal Reserve System, Order Approving the Establishment of an Agency, Chiao 
Thng Bank, Taipei, Taiwan, Mar. 18, 1993. Notice of the application was published on June 
5, 1992. Id. at 1. In this case, the application appears to have been processed by the Fed-
eral Reserve rather rapidly-i.e., less than a year between publication and approval dates. 
65. ld. On the one hand, perhaps CTB acted prematurely in leasing office space and 
sending staff. On the other hand, the behavior seems appropriate; with the state license in 
hand, CTB reasonably believed that a Federal Reserve license would be forthcoming in the 
near future. 
66. 12 U.S.C. § 3101 (Supp. IV 1992), as amended by FBSEA, supra note 2. 
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should be accorded substantively equal treatment as domestic banks: 
By duplicating state regulatory approval processes and supervision, 
the FBSEA ensures that foreign banks will bear a greater regulatory 
burden than domestic banks. In subtle but significant ways, the FB-
SEA has imposed standards on foreign banks that are more strict or 
comprehensive than those facing domestic banks. The result is a de-
parture from the policy of national treatment.67 
33 
A domestic bank must get approval from the OCC in order to obtain a 
federal charter.68 To obtain a state charter, a domestic bank must get 
approval from the state bank regulator in the state in which it seeks the 
charter. In neither of these cases is the Federal Reserve involved in the 
chartering or licensing process.69 Thus, to procure a license to operate a 
bank, domestic organizers require one regulatory approval while foreign 
banks require two such approvals (the Federal Reserve license plus OCC 
or state regulatory permission). 
Undermining the principle of national treatment is prima facie illogical. 
Increasing the number of applications that a foreign bank must submit to 
U.S. authorities is no guarantee that weak or bad banks will be filtered 
out from strong, upstanding banks.70 To be sure, the probability of de-
tecting "another BCCI" may increase. But, this logic would lead to an 
infinite regulatory burden-four approval requirements would be better 
than three, and so forth-and, therefore, an infinitely high non-tariff 
barrier. 
The principle of national treatment is further undermined by the fact 
that once a Federal Reserve license is obtained and Maharajah Bank 
commences business in the U.S. as a branch, agency, or representative 
office, it must pay for its own periodic examinations. Domestic banks are 
not assessed fees for the costs bank examiners incur in conducting their 
exams. FBSEA empowers the Federal Reserve to examine each agency 
and branch of a foreign bank and to charge the examined institutions for 
the costs of the examination.71 
67. Bellanger, supra note 49, at 10. 
68. 12 u.s.c. §§ 21, 26, 27 (1988). 
69. The Federal Reserve is, of course, responsible for approving applications to form 
bank holding companies. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(5)(A) (1988). 
70. See generally Regulation of Foreign Banks: Hearing before House Comm. on 
Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1991) (testimony of Alan 
Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, acknowledging 
that problems of secret ownership of U.S. banks through several tranches of nominee 
shareholder arrangements may recur in spite of new legislation, such as FBSEA). 
Interestingly, when FBSEA was being drafted, proponents of the legislation admitted 
they had sufficient powers under the IBA to prevent BCCI from acquiring a controlling 
interest in First American. After all, the Federal Reserve had the authority to deny the 
application of Credit and Commerce American Holdings, N.Y., to purchase the shares of 
Financial General. Fed-Drafted Bill on Foreign Control Gets Mixed Reviews before Senate 
Banking, 56 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1041, 1042 (1991). 
71. 12 U.S.C. § 3105(c)(l) (Supp. IV 1992). One could argue that the deposit insur-
ance premiums paid by domestic banks (including subsidiaries of foreign banks) help de-
fray the cost of examinations. This argument is implausible. First, the premiums are paid 
to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and are not shared by the FDIC 
with the Federal Reserve or OCC to cover examinations conducted by these other regula-
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Examination fee assessments represent not only another transaction 
cost for Maharajah Bank's U.S. operations, but also a departure from the 
IBA's principle of national treatment. The cost of operating a branch, 
agency or representative office in the U.S. increases for foreign banks 
because they have to pay for their own examinations, while domestic 
banks are not charged for their own examinations. Even Federal Reserve 
Chairman Alan Greenspan admits this policy contradicts the national 
treatment policy of the IBA.72 Nevertheless, the Federal Reserve re-
cently issued a notice of proposed rulemaking regarding the assessment 
of examination fees on U.S. branches, agencies, and representative of-
fices.73 The amount to charge for an examination is calculated by multi-
plying the number of hours Federal Reserve examiners take to examine a 
foreign bank by an hourly rate. The number of examiner hours is not 
measured by recording the actual hours expended on an examination. In-
stead, the Federal Reserve applies a formula based on the characteristics 
of the foreign bank, such as asset size and organizational complexity. The 
hourly rate is approximately $47, which includes personnel, travel, and 
other costs. Based on 1993 statistics, the Federal Reserve estimates that 
almost $12 million in examination fees will be earned annually. 
c. THE IRONY: UNNECESSARY BARRIERS 
1. The Incongruity with GATS Article VI 
Are the increased delays and monetary costs imposed on Maharajah 
Bank consistent with the GATS? To be sure, the GATS does not pre-
clude Parties (i.e., the member countries) from implementing domestic 
regulatory measures. These include "measures for prudential reasons, in-
cluding for the protection of investors, depositors, policy holders or per-
sons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service supplier, or 
to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system."74 But, "all 
measures of general application affecting trade in services" must be "ad-
ministered in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner."75 More-
tors. Second, given the recent problems involving the bank insurance fund, that premium 
revenue would be diverted to pay examination costs is unlikely. 
72. Letter from Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, to Henry Gonzalez (D-Texas), Chairman, House Banking Committee, June 
24, 1993. See also Fed Reluctant to Charge Foreign Banks for Exams, Urges Congress to 
Intervene, 61 Banking Rep. (BNA) 9 (July 5, 1993). 
73. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Charging for Examinations of 
U.S. Branches, Agencies, and Representative Offices of Foreign Banks, 58 Fed. Reg. 239 
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 211) (proposed Dec. 15, 1993). Of course, whether this 
proposal, or a modified version of it, will be implemented is uncertain. See also Fed Seeks 
Comment on Proposal to Charge Foreign Banks for Exams, Banking Daily (BNA) (Dec. 
14, 1993). 
74. GATS, Annex on Financial Services, § 2.1 (hereinafter Annex]. A "financial ser-
vice supplier" is a supplier of banking, insurance, or other financial services, e.g., a com-
mercial bank, insurance company, or securities firm. Id. §§ 5.1-.2. A "measure" is any 
"law, regulation, rule, procedure, decision, administrative action, or [measure of] any other 
form." GATS, supra note 5, art. XXVIII:(a). 
75. !d. art. VI:l. 
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over, the "measures relating to qualification requirements and 
licensing requirements" must not "constitute unnecessary barriers to 
trade."76 They must not be "more burdensome than necessary to ensure 
the quality of the service" and must "not in themselves [serve as] a re-
striction on the supply of the service. "77 
If the Federal Reserve license were the only license required of Maha-
rajah Bank, then perhaps it would be a justified prudential measure. In-
stead, the license is unnecessarily duplicative and, thus, in practice, does 
not play a particularly important role in protecting interested parties or 
safeguarding the financial system. Even Federal Reserve Chairman Alan 
Greenspan suggests that the delays caused by the Federal Reserve licens-
ing requirement are not offset by a higher caliber of Federal Reserve re-
view.78 In essence, the Federal Reserve seems to find the FBSEA and 
revised Regulation K requirements "more burdensome than necessary," 
to quote the language of GATS Article VI:4(b ). 
Some have argued that through the new licensing requirement "the 
Fed is generally trying to upgrade the quality and transparency of interna-
tional banking supervision and is specifically retaining its own regulatory 
trigger in the event overseas home-country supervision or the informa-
tion available on a particular foreign bank is deemed inadequate in the 
view of the Fed."79 This argument is not a compelling rebuttal to the 
contention that the Federal Reserve licensing requirement is incongruous 
with the GATS provisions discussed above because it is based on two 
implicit false premises regarding state bank regulators and, to a lesser 
extent, the OCC. 
The first false premise of the rebuttal concerns the performance of 
these other regulators in the BCCI affair, holding that the New York and 
California bank regulators did a poor job of regulating BCCI's New York 
and California agencies, respectively. There is nothing in the record of 
the BCCI case, the legislative history to FBSEA, or the comments or 
justification for promulgation of the revisions to Regulation K that sug-
gests the state regulatory approval process (or that of the OCC) was seri-
ously defective. The interests of depositors and other creditors, and the 
financial system generally, appear to have been well protected through 
the licensing requirements of the OCC and the state regulators. In the 
BCCI affair, what is often forgotten is that the critical regulatory ap-
proval for the takeover of the First American banks by BCCI nominees 
was granted by the Federal Reserve (not by the states or the OCC).80 
76. Id. art. VI:4. 
77. ld. art. VI:4(b)-(c). 
78. Letter from Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System to Senator Bob Graham (D.-Florida), Jan. 8, 1993 (stating that "[t]he process-
ing ... of applications has proved to be more cumbersome than the Board expected .... "). 
79. Gail, supra note 2, at 997. See also Fanikos, supra note 2, at 506. 
80. This approval came on Aug. 25, 1981. Approval from the New York State Banking 
Department followed, as an inevitable result, on Mar. 2, 1982. July 29, 1991 Federal Re-
serve Order, supra note 55, at 26. See also BHALA, supra note 3, at ch. I. An application 
was made to the Federal Reserve under the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1842 
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Moreover, state bank regulators were instrumental in making sure that 
no creditors of BCCI's New York and California agencies lost money.81 
They ensured that BCCI's U.S. operations had positive net worth and 
successfully "ring-fenced" (or shielded) BCCI's U.S. assets from liquida-
tion proceedings conducted in Luxembourg. Creditors of the U.S. opera-
tions were thereby assured of payment in full for their claims. 
A second false premise of the rebuttal is that, in the future, state bank 
regulators will be less able to cope with major multinational bank failures 
arising from fraud. Underlying the premise is the stereotypical view that 
state bank regulators are too small and unsophisticated to deal with large 
international banks. This view overemphasizes both the resources and 
competence of federal bank regulators. Federal regulators are neither 
particularly well-endowed with examiners and staff, nor infallible. This 
view also ignores part of the history of the BCCI case. 
Bank regulators in New York and California protected creditors of 
BCCI's agencies in those states by imposing stringent asset maintenance 
requirements, thereby ensuring the agencies had positive net worth when 
BCCI was closed down. The state regulators also successfully fought ef-
forts to consolidate the assets of BCCI's New York and California agen-
cies with the general liquidation proceeding in Luxembourg (i.e., ring-
fencing the assets), thereby ensuring that the claims of creditors of the 
agencies would be paid in full. Finally, the stereotypical view of state 
bank regulators being too small and unsophisticated neglects the signifi-
cant reforms undertaken by state bank regulators to strengthen further 
their abilities to supervise cross-border banking establishments.82 
Clearly, the higher the transaction cost of entering the U.S. banking 
market, the more likely Maharajah Bank will be deterred from the mar-
ket. At the margin, similarly situated foreign banks that would have 
opened offices in the U.S., but for the licensing requirements imposed by 
FBSEA and revised Regulation K, will not do so because of the increased 
expense. This means otherwise profitable ventures are rendered unprof-
itable by the law. This is a restriction on the supply of foreign bank serv-
ices. The results are that the liquidity these banks would have injected 
into the market is lost and innovative banking techniques they would 
have introduced are foregone. The transaction cost associated with the 
Federal Reserve license is a manifestation of the unnecessary non-tariff 
barrier erected against foreign banks. 
(1988) by the nominees, because the shares of the First American banks were being ac-
quired through a series of bank holding companies. 
81. See BHALA, supra note 3, at chs. III & V (discussing the performance of state bank 
regulators). 
82. See BHALA, supra note 3, at ch. V (discussing post-BCCI reforms at the state 
level). On the argument that the Federal Reserve licensing requirement unifies and clari-
fies regulatory procedures, see id. ch. III. See also MARIO CuoMo ET AL., REPORT OF THE 
SUPERINTENDENT'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TRANSNATIONAL BANKING INSTITUTIONS 
(1992). 
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2. The Incongruity with GATS Article XVII 
The Federal Reserve licensing requirement and the assessment of ex-
amination costs on Maharajah Bank are incongruous with the national 
treatment principle articulated in the GATS. Article XVII:l states "each 
Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Mem-
ber, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment 
no less favorable than that it accords to its own like services and service 
suppliers. "83 
Domestic banks are not subject to the same strict Federal Reserve li-
censing process as foreign banks. The federal branch or agency of a for-
eign bank is subject to examination by two federal regulators (the Federal 
Reserve and the OCC). In contrast, a single entity within a domestic 
banking organization is subject to regulation by one primary federal regu-
lator. A domestic bank holding company is subject to one primary fed-
eral regulator (the Federal Reserve).84 Similarly, a domestic bank 
subsidiary is subject to one primary federal regulator (the Federal Re-
serve, OCC, or Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)).85 The 
heightened regulatory scrutiny under FBSEA and revised Regulation K 
for foreign banks is, therefore, at odds with the GATS. 
3. The Incongruity with GATS Article XIX 
The licensing requirement faced by Maharajah Bank is troublesome, 
not only because it is burdensome and inconsistent with the national 
treatment principle, but also because it cannot be squared with the liber-
alization process set in motion by the GATS. Under Article XIX, Mem-
bers commit themselves to "achieving a progressively higher level of 
liberalization."86 This commitment is to be fulfilled through negotiations 
"directed to the reduction or elimination of the adverse effects on trade 
in services of measures as a means of providing effective market 
access. "87 
Under Article XIX:2 of the GATS, "due respect" is given to individual 
developing countries that might need to open fewer service sectors, liber-
alize fewer types of transactions, and generally extend market access to 
foreign service suppliers in a gradual manner that is "in line with their 
development situation."88 In contrast, developed countries like the 
83. GATS, supra note 5, art. XVII:l. 
84. See Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1988) (regarding regula-
tion of bank holding companies by the Federal Reserve). 
85. See the definition of "appropriate Federal banking agency" at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1813(q)(1)-(3) (Supp. IV 1992) (dividing regulatory responsibilities under the Federal 
Deposit Insurance (FDI) Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1834b (1988), among the Federal Reserve, 
OCC, and FDIC). See also the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-26(e) (1988) (regarding 
regulation of national banks by the OCC). 
86. GATS, supra note 5, art. XIX:l. 
87. ld. The negotiations may be on a bilateral, plurilateral, or multilateral basis. ld. 
art. XIX:4. 
88. /d. art. XIX:2. See generally Robert E. Hudec, GATT and the Developing Coun-
tries, 1992 CoLUM. Bus. L. REv. 67, 76 (1992) (discussing "special and differential treat-
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United States are expected to make their markets accessible on a swift 
basis, no doubt because their service suppliers are sufficiently competitive 
to withstand challenges presented by foreign service providers. 
The licensing requirement might be more appropriate for a developing 
country concerned about the potentially ruinous effects that immediate 
and complete liberalization could have on "infant" domestic banks than 
for the U.S., whose banks compete effectively with their foreign counter-
parts. A staged approach to market access presumably might allow banks 
from LDCs and NICs time to develop the strength and standing to sur-
vive in a fierce, global marketplace. The provisions of the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) concerning access of U.S. and 
Canadian banks to the Mexican market are a case in point. The ability of 
U.S. and Canadian banks to establish operations in Mexico is enhanced 
on a progressive basis during a transition period ending in the year 2000. 
During this period, the aggregate market share limit allowed to U.S. and 
Canadian banks will increase from eight to fifteen percent.89 After the 
transition period, there will be no market share limits on U.S. or Cana-
dian bank operations in Mexico.90 These provisions illustrate the special 
attention paid by NAFTA to Mexico's status as a developing country and 
are akin to Article XIX:2 of the GATS. Ironically, the licensing require-
ment established by FBSEA and revised Regulation K seem more fitting 
for Mexico pursuant to NAFTA or a developing country pursuant to 
GATS Article XIX:2, than for the U.S. 
IV. ACT II: EVALUATING THE APPLICATION 
THE SCENE 
Enter the Federal Reserve lawyers and financial analysts, and assume 
that Maharajah Bank decides to attempt to open a branch in New York. 
These Federal Reserve officials study its branch license application. Long 
meetings are held at the Federal Reserve with Maharajah Bank repre-
sentatives. The lawyers and financial analysts write lengthy letters to Ma-
harajah Bank stating that its application contains numerous informational 
and legal deficiencies. The centerpiece of the Federal Reserve's evalua-
tion is a potentially discriminatory standard: home-country, comprehen-
ment" for developing countries under the GAIT and recent unilateral actions, which are 
"the diametric opposite of the idea of rewarding developing countries for their new 
liberalizations"). 
89. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Pub. L. No. 103-182, ch. 14, 107 Stat. 
2057 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]; Governments of Canada, the United Mexican States, 
and the United States of America, Description of the Proposed North American Free Trade 
Agreement, 34-35 (Aug. 12, 1992) (stating that during the transition phase, no U.S. or Ca-
nadian bank may have a market share in Mexico in excess of 1.5 percent). 
90. U.S. and Canadian banks, however, will not be permitted to acquire the largest 
Mexican banks, and must operate in Mexico through subsidiaries, rather than branches or 
agencies. NAFTA, supra note 89, at ch. 14. See also Harry G. Broadman, International 
Trade and Investment in Services: A Comparative Analysis of the NAFTA, 27 INT'L LAw. 
623, 643 (1993). 
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sive, consolidated supervision.91 
A. CoMPREHENSIVE, CoNSOLIDATED SuPERVISION 
How does the Federal Reserve decide whether to grant Maharajah 
Bank a license to open a branch, agency, or representative office? FB-
SEA and revised Regulation K establish three mandatory standards92 
and nine discretionary standards93 for the Federal Reserve to apply in 
making a licensing determination. Of the twelve standards, the most 
noteworthy and controversial is the mandatory standard that Maharajah 
Bank be supervised by its home-country bank regulatory authority on a 
comprehensive, consolidated basis.94 This standard is consistent with the 
recommendations of the Group of Ten (G-10) countries acting under the 
auspices of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (Basle Commit-
tee) of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basle, Switzer-
land.95 In the aftermath of the BCCI affair, the BIS member countries 
stated that "[a ]11 international banking groups and international banks 
91. This standard also would be applied if Maharajah Bank had opted for an agency or 
representative office. 
92. 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1992); Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. § 211.25(c)(1) 
(1993). Technically, two factors are listed in the statute, but the language makes clear that 
there are actually three. See id. § 3105(d)(2)(A), (B). 
93. Satisfying the mandatory standards is a necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, 
condition for obtaining a Federal Reserve license. The Federal Reserve can consider any 
or all of the nine discretionary standards in examining a foreign bank application to open a 
branch, agency, or representative office in the U.S. 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(3) (Supp. IV 
1992). These concern: (1) an exit visa (i.e., whether the appropriate authorities in the 
home-country of the foreign bank applicant have consented to the proposed establishment 
of an agency or branch in the U.S.) (see 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(3)(A); Regulation K, 12 
C.F.R. § 211.25(c)(2)(i)); (2) the financial resources of the foreign bank applicant (see 12 
U.S.C. § 3105(d)(3)(B); Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. § 211.25(c)(2)(ii)); (3) the managerial re-
sources of the foreign bank (see 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(3)(B); 12 C.F.R. § 211.25(c)(2)(iii)); 
(4) information sharing (i.e., whether the home-country regulator of the foreign bank 
shares material information about the bank with banking regulators in other countries) 
(see Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. § 211.25(c)(2)(iv)); (5) the provision of adequate assurances 
by the foreign bank that it will provide the Federal Reserve with information on the bank 
and its affiliates, so that the Federal Reserve can enforce U.S. banking law (see 12 U.S.C. 
§ 3105(d)(3)(C); Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. § 211.25(c)(2)(v)); (6) compliance with U.S. 
banking law (see 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(3)(D); Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. § 211.25(c)(2)(vi)); 
(7) the needs of the community in which the foreign bank proposes to operate (see 12 
U.S.C. § 3105(d)(4); Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. § 211.25(c)(3)); (8) the length of time the 
foreign bank has operated and its operating history (see Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. 
§ 211.25(c)(3)); (9) size (i.e., the relative size of the foreign bank in its home-country) (see 
12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(4); Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. § 211.25(c)(3)). 
In addition to the nine discretionary standards, the Federal Reserve can impose any 
additional conditions for approval that it deems necessary. Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. 
§ 211.25(c)(4) (1993). 
94. The other two mandatory standards concern the business of the foreign bank and 
the provision of information. First, the foreign bank must engage directly in the business 
of banking outside of the U.S. (see 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1992); Regulation 
K, 12 C.F.R. § 211.25(c)(1)(i)(A) (1993)). Second, the foreign bank must furnish informa-
tion to the Federal Reserve that is needed to adequately assess the application (see 12 
U.S.C. § 3105(d)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1992); Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. § 211.25(c)(1)(i)(B) 
(1993)). 
95. The G-10 countries are represented on the Baste Committee and at the BIS by 
officials from their central banks. See supra note 16. 
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should be supervised by a home-country authority that capably performs 
consolidated supervision. "96 
The key factor in deciding whether a foreign bank regulator exercises 
comprehensive, consolidated supervision is whether that regulator "re-
ceives sufficient information on the worldwide operations of the foreign 
bank ... to assess its overall financial condition and compliance with law 
and regulation."97 To decide whether the home-country regulator re-
ceives such information, the Federal Reserve checks whether the home-
country regulator (1) ensures that the foreign bank adequately monitors 
its global activities,98 (2) obtains information on the condition of the for-
eign bank's offices outside of the home-country "through regular reports 
of examination, audit reports, or otherwise," and on the relationship be-
tween the foreign bank and its affiliates,99 (3) receives consolidated finan-
cial reports from the foreign bank,100 and (4) evaluates prudential 
standards such as capital adequacy on a world-wide basis.l01 
Thus, the Federal Reserve is cast in the role of judging not only Maha-
rajah Bank, but also the foreign regulators that are responsible for super-
vising the Bank, and is legally empowered to deny license applications 
from any foreign bank from a country whose regulators do not meet the 
comprehensive, consolidated supervision standard. 
B. THE TRAGEDY: DISCRIMINATION 
1. The Unquestioned Faith 
Generally, consolidated supervision is accepted with little or no critical 
analysis. Professor Dale argues that "[o]ne clear lesson from the BCCI 
affair, therefore, is that consolidated supervision should be mandatory for 
all international banks without exception."102 Professor Norton points 
out that "[t]he recent U.S. statute and regulations on foreign bank super-
vision incorporate the principles of 'effective' consolidated supervision 
into the application, termination, and examination processes for foreign 
96. BASLE COMMITIEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SET· 
TLEMENTS, BASLE, SWITZERLAND, MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE SUPERVISION OF INTER-
NATIONAL BANKING GROUPS AND THEIR CRoss-BORDER EsTABLISHMENTS 3 (June 1992). 
For a critique of the work of the Baste Committee, see BHALA, supra note 3, at chs. VII & 
VIII. See also Duncan E. Alford, Baste Committee Minimum Standards: International 
Regulatory Response to the Failure of BCCI, 26 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 241 
(1992). 
97. Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. § 211.25(c)(ii) (1993). 
98. Id. § 211.25(c)(1)(ii)(A). 
99. Id. § 211.25(c)(1)(ii)(B)-(C). 
100. ld. § 211.25(c)(1)(ii)(D). 
101. ld. § 211.25(c)(1)(ii)(E). 
102. Richard Dale, Reflections on the BCCI Affair: A United Kingdom Perspective, 26 
INT'L LAw. 949, 951 (1992) (emphasis in original). See also Alford, supra note 96, at 272-73 
(stating that the reaffirmation of the comprehensive, consolidated supervision was a re-
sponse to the BCCI affair, not an effort to keep banks from the Third World out of U.S. 
markets.); RICHARD DALE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING DEREGULATION 199-202 (1991) 
(questioning the exception to the principle of comprehensive, consolidated supervision 
that allows for coordinated supervision of bank holding companies with separately incor-
porated subsidiaries in different countries). 
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banks."103 Professor Scott supports the principle of consolidated supervi-
sion, saying that, if bank regulators from two countries are responsible for 
the supervision of an international bank, then neither regulator "is in the 
position to determine the safety and soundness of the entire operation, 
and matters can easily fall between the cracks."104 State bank regulators 
in the U.S. and the European Union (EU) have jumped on the band-
wagon. As a result of the BCCI affair, the New York State Banking De-
partment requires foreign banks operating in New York to be supervised 
on a comprehensive, consolidated basis by a home-country regulator who 
cooperates with New York authorities.105 The EU calls for consolidated 
supervision by the home-country bank regulator,106 and British commen-
tators have urged that it be applied in a rigorous manner.107 
This unquestioned faith is based, in part, on the common sense notion 
that only consolidated supervision of a bank with offices in more than one 
country can produce a "bird's eye view" or the "big picture" of the entire 
international banking organization. Some commentators have said that 
banks with complex organizational structures can exploit gaps in regula-
tion unless one bank regulator is allocated the responsibility of supervis-
ing the entire banking group.108 The rationale assumes that bank 
103. Joseph J. Norton, Introductory Observations, 26 INT'L LAw. 943, 944 (1992) (em-
phasis added). See also Fanikos, supra note 2, at 495 ("[c]onsolidated home-country review 
is the only method for making a global determination as to whether the foreign bank oper-
ates in a financially sound and acceptable manner [footnote omitted]"); Daniel M. Laifer, 
Note, Putting the Super Back in the Supervision of International Banking, Post-BCCI, 60 
FoRDHAM L. REv. S467, S479-83 (1992) ("no one regulatory authority was watching 'the 
big picture'"). 
104. Hal S. Scott, Supervision of International Banking Post-BCCI, 8 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 487, 493 (1992). 
105. CuoMo, supra note 82, at 101. See also John G. Heimann, Report of the State of 
New York Banking Department Superintendent's Advisory Committee on Transnational 
Banking Institutions- Summary of Recommendations, 26 INT'L LAw. 987, 988 (1992). 
106. The EU's adherence to the principle is established in a number of directives from 
the Council of Ministers. See Council Directive 83/350 of 13 June 1983 on the Supervision 
of Credit Institutions on a Consolidated Basis, 1983 O.J. (L 193) 18 (establishing the princi-
ple of home-country supervision) (First Consolidated Supervision Directive); Second 
Council Directive 89/646 of 15 December 1989 on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations 
and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of 
Credit Institutions and Amending Directive 77n80, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1 (commonly re-
ferred to as the Second Banking Directive). See also the Second Consolidated Supervision 
Directive, adopted by the Council of the European Community on April 6, 1992. This was 
implemented on April6, 1992, and replaces the First Consolidated Supervision Directive of 
June 13, 1983. Council Directive 92/30/EEC of 6 April 1992 on the Supervision of Credit 
Institutions on a Consolidated Basis, 1992 O.J. (L 110). An exception to the principle is 
allowed for the instance where a bank, like BCCI, is incorporated in one jurisdiction, but 
most of its operations are based in another jurisdiction. Then, the banking regulator in the 
second jurisdiction is primarily responsible for supervision. Under this scheme, the Bank 
of England, not the Institut Monetaire Luxembourgeois (Monetary Institute of Luxem-
bourg) (IML) or the Inspector of Banks and Trusts of the Cayman Islands, would have 
been primarily responsible for regulating BCCI. 
107. See, e.g., Sara Walker, The Bank of England as Supervisor, 6 BVTIERWORTHS J. 
INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 489, 494 (1991). 
108. Indeed, BCCI did just this by incorporating holding companies in Luxembourg 
(BCCI Holdings and BCCI S.A.) and the Cayman Islands (BCCI Overseas), while operat-
ing out of London, England (BCCI S.A. and, to some extent, BCCI Overseas). See David 
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regulators in different countries cannot effectively act in concert to ensure 
that every part of a complex international banking group is adequately 
supervised, i.e., inevitably, there will be gaps.109 This may be a needlessly 
pessimistic approach,U0 but, for present purposes, the crucial point is that 
the approach is a tragic and ironic one because of its protectionist effects. 
2. The Two-Tiered International Banking Market 
From time to time, Federal Reserve officials have denied they seek to 
reduce foreign bank presence in the U.S. or protect domestic banks from 
foreign competition.111 The effect of applying the mandatory standard of 
home-country comprehensive, consolidated supervision, however, is 
likely to be the denial or restriction of market access to banks from LDCs 
and NICs. In Professor Niebuhr's language, the value of free trade in 
banking services is sacrificed in favor of the value of rooting out per-
ceived evil foreign banks. 
Judging which foreign bank regulators satisfy the mandatory standard 
of comprehensive, consolidated supervision in order to root out the evil 
has interesting implications for the pattern of world trade in banking 
services. Regulators from certain countries are likely to be found defi-
cient, thus their banks are likely to be excluded from the U.S. market or 
have an especially difficult time entering it. The list of countries whose 
bank regulators will not "make the grade" is easy to forecast-Latin 
American, Asian, and African countries,112 i.e., those from most LDCs 
Lascelles, First Steps Toward Tougher Regulation, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 2, 1991, at 
13, col. 1. As William Taylor, former Staff Director, Division of Banking Supervision and 
Regulation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, argued in the BCCI con-
text: "no one country had a clear view of the BCCI's worldwide activities or the responsi-
bility to supervise the company on a consolidated basis." 77 FED. REs. BuLL. 569, 571 
(1991). . 
109. See, e.g., Regulation of Foreign Banks: Hearing before House Comm. on Banking, 
Finance and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 68 (1991) (testimony and prepared text 
of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). 
110. See BHALA, supra note 3, at ch. IV (arguing that why one bank regulator exercis-
ing comprehensive, consolidated supervision is more effective at penetrating the bank's 
organizational complexity than a group of regulators from the countries in which the bank 
operates if this group pools its resources and knowledge is less than clear). 
111. For example, Robert P. Forrestal, President, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 
stated that "I am aware that some people argue that [FBSEA] was a thinly veiled attempt 
by the U.S. Congress to reduce foreign bank presence in the United States .... However, 
U.S. policy has long sought to ensure that foreign and domestic banks have a fair and equal 
opportunity to participate in our markets." Quoted in Fed Unlikely to End Foreign Bank 
Activity in Light of FDIC/A, 58 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1071 (June 15, 1992). See also Baste 
Committee on Banking Supervision Issues New Standards to Prevent Fraud, 59 Banking 
Rep. (BNA) 82, 83 (July 13, 1992) (denial by E. Corrigan, former President, Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York, that protectionism was a motive behind the response of the BIS 
to the BCCI affair). 
112. Fernando A. Capablanca, Making Waves, 50 LATINFINANCE TF52, Sept. 1993, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, Mags File, at *2 (stating that both larger and smaller 
Latin American countries are unlikely to meet the requirement of comprehensive, consoli-
dated supervision); Gary N. Kleiman, Comment, AN Rx TO SPUR GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
SERVICES, AM. BANKER, Aug. 9, 1993, at 19 ("[c]onsolidated oversight rules embraced last 
year in the wake of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International scandal have barred 
the expansion of Latin America-based and Asia-based groups, notably in the United 
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and NICs.113 This list will, therefore, include India and Malaysia, the two 
countries in which Maharajah Bank is principally located. Put bluntly, 
the Reserve Bank of India and Bank Negara, the respective bank regula-
tors in India and Malaysia responsible for supervising Maharajah Bank, 
are unlikely to make the grade in the judgment of the Federal Reserve. 
Accordingly, Maharajah Bank will be denied access to the U.S. market. 
Conversely, an exclusive "club" of bank regulators from the U.S., west-
ern Europe, and Japan is likely to develop. Bank regulators from the G-
10 countries will be judged by the Federal Reserve to provide the requi-
site supervision: 
One would like to think, however, that foreign banks based in indus-
trialized countries, such as Japan and countries in the European Com-
munity, will have little difficulty in establishing that these standards 
[for comprehensive, consolidated supervision] are satisfied; however, 
it would likely create significant compliance burdens if every foreign 
bank, even from these countries, is required to establish in each ap-
plication that its home-country meets these requirements. It would 
seem far more efficient if the [Federal Reserve] Board could assess 
at least the principal industrialized nations in this regard independent 
of the application process and perhaps publish a list of countries 
which it believes satisfy the comprehensive consolidated supervision 
standard.114 
Regulators from other G-10 countries that adopt the Basle Commit-
tee's ·recommendation on comprehensive, consolidated supervision are 
likely to view U.S. banks favorably because of their favorable judgment 
of U.S. bank regulators. In this paradigm, comprehensive, consolidated 
supervision is a euphemism for the true underlying requirement - a for-
eign bank seeking to open an office in the U.S. should come from a club 
country. 
The result may be a two-tiered market in international banking. In one 
market, banks from the G-10 countries will predominate. Citibank, 
Chase Manhattan Bank, National Westminster Bank, Barclays, Bank of 
States, where the principles are embodied in the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement 
Act"); James R. Kraus, Fed Approves Foreign-Bank Rules; Program to Control Entry was 
Mandated by Congress, AM. BANKER, Apr. 3, 1992, at 5 ("[T]he regulations are likely to 
fall most heavily on banks from developing countries, which may not be subject to consoli-
dated supervision and where supervision may not be up to U.S. standards."). See also 
James R. Kraus, Venezuela Says New Bank Supervisory Law Satisfies U.S. Requirement, 
AM. BANKER, Nov. 16, 1993, at 9 (concerning the enactment of a new Venezuelan bank 
regulatory law that might meet the comprehensive, consolidated supervision requirement). 
113. See UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, NEW ISSUES 
FOR TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION IN TRANSNATIONAL BANKING (1992); Steve Lohr, 
U.N. Study Assails the Way B.C. C.!. Was Shut by Western Central Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
5, 1992, at D7. The Federal Reserve readily acknowledges that many countries simply do 
not exercise comprehensive, consolidated supervision. See FBSEA Application Bottleneck 
Soon Will Disappear, Atlanta Fed Chief Says, 60 Banking Rep. (BNA) 275 (Mar. 1, 1993) 
(quoting Robert P. Forrestal, President, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, as saying that 
"[i]n many countries, this concept of consolidated supervision has not yet taken root"). 
114. Robert E. Hand, How Foreign Banks in the United States Are Dealing with the 
Changing Legal and Supervisory Environment, 26 INT'L LAw. 1015, 1017 (1992) (emphasis 
added). 
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Tokyo, Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Union 
Bank of Switzerland, Credit Suisse, and others will be the key players in 
the famous G-10 financial markets in New York, London, Tokyo, Frank-
furt, and Zurich. Relatively few banks from the LDCs and NICs will be 
allowed to establish operations in these centers, and their market pres-
ence will be minimal. Banks from the LDCs and NICs-such as Mahara-
jah Bank in this case and, in reality, Malayan Banking Berhad (Malaysia), 
Bank Negara Indonesia (Indonesia), Bank of Baroda (India), Bank of 
Commerce and Development (Egypt), Bahrain Middle East Bank 
(Bahrain), and Banco Frances del Rio de Ia Plata (Argentina)-will be 
consigned to the second market. Their financial centers will be periph-
eral-Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Bombay, Cairo, Bahrain, and Buenos 
Aires. The mandatory standard of comprehensive, consolidated supervi-
sion-if applied by G-10 countries, in addition to the U.S., pursuant to 
the Basle Supervisors Minimum Standards Paper-will be the device that 
separates banks into the first or second tier. 
Interestingly, Mexico could be an example of a second-tier country. 
NAFTA specifies that "[n]o Party [i.e., the U.S., Canada, or Mexico) may 
adopt any measure restricting any type of cross-border trade in financial 
services by cross-border financial service providers of another 
Party .... "115 The clear thrust of Chapter 14 of NAFT A is on liberalizing 
market access. Yet, the application of a large Mexican bank, Banamex, to 
establish a branch in Miami was denied by the Federal Reserve.116 The 
reason was that the Mexican banking authority did not examine banks in 
a consolidated manner locally, nor did it monitor their overseas opera-
tions.117 The Banamex rejection caused banks from other Latin Ameri-
can countries to curtail their plans for expansion in the U.S.118 
c. THE IRONY: TRANSPARENCY 
1. The Incongruity with GATS Article III 
The problem of transparency of a non-tariff barrier concerns whether 
the nature of the barrier (as well as the manner in which it is imple-
mented) is plainly evident in the case of Maharajah Bank. Non-tariff bar-
riers potentially are more sinister and pernicious than tariff barriers, 
because they are less obvious, more hidden, more transparent, and more 
subjective than tariffs. Article III of the GATS requires each Party to 
publish promptly all relevant laws, regulations, and administrative guide-
lines that affect trade in services.l19 Each Party is obligated to respond 
promptly to requests for specific information regarding its laws, regula-
tions, and administrative guidelines and to establish an "enquiry point" 
115. NAFfA, supra note 89, art. 1404. This is subject to certain limitations set forth in 
Annex VII(B) of each Party's schedule. 
116. To be sure, the application was submitted before NAFfA entered into force. 
117. Kleiman, supra note 112, at 19. 
118. ld. 
119. GATS, supra note 5, art. III:l. 
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that will provide such information.120 
In three respects, the post-BCCI legal regime for regulating Maharajah 
Bank is incongruous with these GATS provisions. First, which foreign 
bank regulators, in the eyes of the Federal Reserve, offer comprehensive, 
consolidated supervision is unclear. Accordingly, every bank that wants 
to establish a branch, agency, or representative office must attempt to 
prove that its home-country regulator provides comprehensive, consoli-
dated supervision. 
This raises the second incongruity. The GATS provisions imply that 
the nature of the measures enacted by a party are clear. But, how does 
the Federal Reserve interpret comprehensive, consolidated supervision? 
Maharajah Bank, as an applicant, may be hampered by a lack of certainty 
as to what must be proven to the Federal Reserve. To be sure, Section 
211.25(c)(l) of revised Regulation K, discussed above, attempts to help 
resolve the issue;121 however, in doing so, the regulation raises a bevy of 
new issues that highlight the fact there is no widely accepted definition of 
"comprehensive, consolidated supervision." 
What is the home-country of Maharajah Bank?122 The only time the 
answer is easy is when a one-parent, foreign bank is incorporated in a 
country, with its principal banking operations conducted there as well. 
But, Maharajah Bank, not unlike BCCI and other international banking 
groups, is incorporated in one jurisdiction (India) and has its principal 
place of business in another jurisdiction (Malaysia).123 In order to obtain 
a Federal Reserve license, will Maharajah Bank have to choose the coun-
try with the regulator that the Federal Reserve perceives to be "tougher" 
for its "home"? Is this the Reserve Bank of India, or Bank Negara? 
Who must prepare the information received by the home-country bank 
regulator, be it the Reserve Bank of India or Bank Negara?124 Is that 
regulator expected to send examiners around the globe to check each 
office of a foreign bank from the regulator's country? Or, could theRe-
serve Bank of India or Bank Negara permissibly rely on reports prepared 
by independent auditors-as the Bank of England and IML did with re-
spect to BCCI? Should there be independent verification of the informa-
tion that is provided? The use of independent auditors as bank 
examiners is a matter over which Maharajah Bank has very little control. 
120. Id. art. III:4. 
121. See supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text. 
122. This problem is created by Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. § 211.25(c)(1)(A) (1993). See 
Scott, supra note 104, at 493 (calling for the establishment of a procedure to determine the 
home-country of a bank); BHALA, supra note 3, at ch. IV (commenting on Professor Scott's 
suggestio:J.s ). 
123. BCCI Holdings, incorporated in Luxembourg, was the top-tier holding company of 
the BCCI group. BCCI (Luxembourg) S.A., incorporated in Luxembourg, and BCCI 
(Overseas), incorporated in the Cayman Islands, were the principal operating subsidiaries. 
The nerve center of BCCI, S.A., was in London, England. See BHALA, supra note 3, at xxi, 
chart I. 
124. This problem is created by Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. § 211.25(c)(1)(ii)(B)-(C) 
(1993). 
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No foreign bank applicant can compel its home-country regulator to hire 
a staff of full-time examiners who are civil servants if this is what the 
Federal Reserve will require for comprehensive, consolidated 
supervision.125 
What procedures are "adequate" for monitoring and controlling the 
world-wide activities of Maharajah Bank?126 Must Maharajah Bank 
prove to the Federal Reserve that it has obtained permission from its 
home-country regulator to establish each of its overseas offices? Or, will 
a sensible strategic expansion policy suffice?t27 
To what extent does comprehensive, consolidated supervision imply 
that a foreign bank regulator, such as the Reserve Bank of India or Bank 
Negara, must have significant powers to take enforcement actions against 
banks from its country and, moreover, have a "proven track record" of 
prosecuting banks? Obviously, different bank regulators have different 
remedial powers and different approaches to investigation and enforce-
ment matters.t28 What is the role of the bank regulator in conducting 
investigations and commencing enforcement actions? Must the source of 
the foreign bank regulator's power be explicit in foreign law? Foreign 
bank applicants will have to deal with these uncertainties and perhaps err 
on the side of attempting to demonstrate to the Federal Reserve that 
125. See BHALA, supra note 3, at chs. IV (discussing a misplaced burden) & VIII (dis-
cussing the problem of independent auditors). 
126. This problem is created by Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. § 211.25(c)(1)(ii)(A) (1993), 
which fails to specify what would be adequate. 
127. In addition to the issues identified above, there are still more troublesome matters: 
Does supervision necessarily require on-site examination? Should consoli-
dated supervision cover nonbank subsidiaries or affiliates? Do the European 
Community countries, which have adopted the EC Directive on the Supervi-
sion of Credit Institutions on a Consolidated Basis, meet the requirement? 
Serge Bellanger, Stormy Weather: The FBSEA 's Impact on Foreign Banks, 25 BANKERS 
MAG. 7, 8 (Nov.-Dec. 1992). 
128. For example, the Federal Reserve takes an active role in investigation and enforce-
ment, and has broad powers under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act; 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811, 
1834b (1988), and can, for example, issue cease and desist orders (12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)), 
assess civil money penalties (12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)), and remove officers and directors of a 
bank from their positions and prohibit them from working in the banking industry (12 
U.S.C. § 1818(e)). Indeed, the Federal Reserve used these powers in the BCCI affair. 
BCCI was assessed a $200 million civil money penalty for secretly owning and controlling 
First American. See July 29, 1991 Federal Reserve Order, supra note 55, H 246-58 at 92-98. 
Removal and prohibition orders were issued against a number of individuals involved. 1d. 
One can fairly say that the American approach to investigation and enforcement is an 
aggressive one. 
The Bank of England provides a sharp contrast, and, traditionally, is rather passive and 
content to leave the pursuit of wrongdoers to Scotland Yard, the Serious Fraud Office, or 
other formal law enforcement authorities. In the aftermath of the BCCI case, the Bank of 
England was singled out for failing to pursue leads regarding fraudulent transactions and 
the manipulation of accounts aggressively. See BHALA, supra note 3, at ch. IV (discussing 
the Bank of England's failure to pursue the truth); THE RIGHT HoNOURABLE LoRD Jus-
TICE BINGHAM, INQUIRY INTO THE SUPERVISION OF THE BANK OF CREDIT AND COM-
MERCE INTERNATIONAL (Report prepared for The Right Honorable Norman Lamont, MP, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Right Honourable Robin Leigh-Pemberton, Gover-
nor of the Bank of England) (Oct. 22, 1992). 
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their home-country regulators are "tough." How they might show this is 
unclear. 
The third incongruity between GATS and the post-BCCI legal regime 
is of concern to any foreign bank from a country that does not engage in 
comprehensive, consolidated supervision. Under FBSEA, the Federal 
Reserve (in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury) is required to 
publish guidelines for the evaluation of applications of banks from these 
countries by December 19, 1992.129 Heretofore, no such guidelines have 
been issued.13° Consequently, foreign banks, including Maharajah Bank, 
that apply for a Federal Reserve license for a proposed branch, agency, or 
representative office potentially face four uncertainties: What does com-
prehensive, consolidated supervision mean? Does the bank's home-
country regulator exercise comprehensive, consolidated supervision? If 
not, can anything be done to rectify the problem? If so, what should be 
done? 
Until the Federal Reserve publishes the long overdue guidelines, for-
eign banks must guess at the answer to the last question. At one extreme, 
foreign banks from countries that do not exercise comprehensive, consol-
idated supervision may be absolutely barred from the U.S. market. At 
the other extreme, the Federal Reserve may undertake to exercise such 
supervision as a condition of allowing a foreign bank into the U.S. Both 
extremes are unpalatable. 
The first is blatantly protectionist and will impact banks from LDCs 
and NICs with the greatest force. Essentially, only banks from the G-10 
countries will be assured of access to the U.S. market. The second im-
plies a commitment of Federal Reserve resources that the Federal Re-
serve is, in all likelihood, unwilling, and perhaps unable, to make. The 
second extreme also implies an arrogant extraterritorialism: the Federal 
Reserve sends the message to certain foreign bank regulators that "you 
cannot do the job we think you should do, so we will do it instead."131 
Thus far, the Federal Reserve has adopted a case-by-case approach to-
ward determinations under the comprehensive, consolidated supervision 
standard. This is not only cumbersome, but also could result in inconsis-
129. 12 U.S.C. § 3105(e)(7) (Supp. IV 1992). 
130. On March 8, 1994, William A. Ryback, associate director of banking and supervi-
sion and regulation for the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, said that 
work on an examination manual regarding the regulation of foreign banks is "about 95% 
done." Bank Agencies Near to Finishing Some International Banking Guidance, 62 Bank-
ing Rep. (BNA) 511 (Mar. 10, 1994). When the manual will be publicly available is not 
known. Whether the manual will provide useful guidance on issues relating to banks from 
countries held not to practice comprehensive, consolidated supervision is not clear either. 
131. While Robert P. Forrestal, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 
defends the home-country comprehensive, consolidated supervision requirement as "es-
sential to sound economic. progress," he agrees that "FBSEA has proven frustrating to 
those banks that have applications pending and may even seem arrogant to foreign coun-
tries that are, in effect, asked to reform their bank regulatory systems if they want their 
banks to do business in the United States." Robert P. Forrestal, President, Federal Re-
serve Bank of Atlanta, quoted in FBSEA Application Bottleneck Soon Will Disappear, At-
lanta Fed Official Says, 60 Banking Rep. (BNA) 276 (Mar. 1, 1993). 
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tent determinations over time. Indeed, "[t]he [Fed's] authority is so wide 
that it may decide consolidated supervision exists for one bank in a cer-
tain country but not for another bank in the same country .... "132 Pre-
sumably, over time, the Federal Reserve should develop a "feel" for bank 
regulators from different countries and draw on its reservoir of experi-
ence with these regulators to determine whether they satisfy the standard. 
Yet, the Federal Reserve will be in a difficult position. On the one hand, 
its determinations should be consistent over time to afford certainty and 
predictability to foreign bank applicants. On the other hand, the Federal 
Reserve must be continually vigilant about changes in the nature and 
quality of regulation provided by foreign authorities. Inevitably, its de-
terminations will, or should, accommodate these changes. Whether the 
Federal Reserve can strike the correct balance remains to be seen. 
2. The Incongruity with GATS Artirle IV 
If the premise that banks from LDCs will be disproportionately af-
fected in an adverse manner by the mandatory standard of comprehen-
sive, consolidated supervision is true, then still another incongruity 
between the GATS and the new U.S. legal regime exists. The GATS re-
quires parties to give special consideration to the needs of service provid-
ers in developing countries. Maharajah Bank, while an example of this 
special class, will not, nevertheless, receive any favored treatment under 
the post-BCCI legal regime in the U.S. Article IV seeks to facilitate the 
increased participation of developing countries, such as India and Malay-
sia, in world trade in services by obligating parties to negotiate specific 
commitments aimed at "the liberalization of market access in sectors and 
modes of supply of export interest to them [i.e., developing countries]."133 
The parties must establish "contact points" to "facilitate the access of de-
veloping countries' service providers to information."134 "Special prior-
ity" in these matters must be given to the "least" developed countries.135 
Nothing in FBSEA or revised Regulation K, or in the Basle Commit-
tee's Minimum Standards Paper, suggests any consideration for the inter-
ests of developing or least developed countries. To the contrary, the 
mandatory standard of comprehensive, consolidated supervision is based 
on the recommendation of the Basle Committee whose membership is 
exclusively limited to the G-10 countries. The standard is a rule of mar-
ket access written by the members of the club for the club. Its nature and 
ambiguity operates against banks with global aspirations from non-
members. 
132. William 0. Bascom, Chief, Bureau of International Banking, Florida Banking De-
partment, quoted in James R. Kraus, Florida Aide Assails Fed on Foreign-Bank Role, AM. 
BANKER, May 1, 1992, at 21. 
133. GATS, supra note 5, art. IV:1(c). The parties also are obligated to negotiate spe-
cific commitments to grant service providers from developing country access to technology 
and distribution channels. See id. art. IV:1(a)-(b). 
134. !d. art. IV:2. 
135. !d. art. IV:3. 
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Suppose a group of bankers in Sierra Leone wants to organize a bank, 
Sierra Leone International Bank (SUB), with offices, not only in other 
African countries, but in London, Tokyo, and New York as well. Like the 
bankers at Maharajah Bank, SUB officials correctly understand that 
SUB will not be a major force in international finance without at least a 
representative office, and preferably a branch or agency, in each of these 
three cities. Suppose further that the Bank of England and the Bank of 
Japan, like the Federal Reserve, have implemented the Basle Commit-
tee's recommendation regarding home-country, comprehensive, consoli-
dated supervision into their municipal law. In deciding whether to 
authorize SUB to do business in their countries, regulators from the 
Bank of England, Bank of Japan, and Federal Reserve will assess whether 
the Bank of Sierra Leone (that country's central bank and bank regula-
tory authority) exercises comprehensive, consolidated supervision. This 
is the same evaluation made by the Federal Reserve with respect to Ma-
harajah Bank's application; does the Reserve Bank of India {India's bank 
regulator) exercise this form of supervision? 
Almost certainly, the Bank of Sierra Leone, like the Reserve Bank of 
India, fails to meet the standard. Nothing in the Bank of Sierra Leone 
{Amendment) Act 1994 suggests that the Bank of Sierra Leone exercises 
comprehensive, consolidated supervision;136 moreover, in all likelihood, 
it cannot engage in that kind of supervision because of a lack of re-
sources. Depending on how comprehensive, consolidated supervision is 
operationalized, the policy may call on bank regulators from NICs and 
LDCs to exercise a level of worldwide supervision that may be difficult 
for any LDC and many NICs to meet. Certainly, the Bank of Sierra Le-
one does not have the resources to hire a full-time staff of examiners 
dedicated to examining the foreign operations of banks from Sierra Le-
one. This entails not only the costs of overseas travel and lodging for the 
examiners, but also special training for them on international banking 
problems. The Bank of Sierra Leone will have to rely on assistance from 
the host-country bank regulators-the Bank of England, Bank of Japan, 
and Federal Reserve. 
Assuming such assistance is not forthcoming, SUB is likely to be de-
nied authorization from the three G-10 bank regulators. In turn, SUB's 
attempt to ascend to the ranks of the great players in international fi-
nance may be thwarted and the dominance of international banks from 
the G-10 countries may be perpetuated. Therefore, in contrast to the 
mandates of the GATS concerning the establishment of "contact points" 
and "special priority" for the least developed countries like Sierra Leone, 
home-country comprehensive, consolidated supervision can serve to re-
tard the development of cross-border banking institutions from NICs and 
LDCs. 
136. See Bank of Sierra Leone {Amendment) Act 1994 (on file with author). 
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To be consistent with GATS, the Bank of England, Bank of Japan, and 
Federal Reserve-the keepers of banking and financial expertise and 
possessors of the necessary supervisory resources-should help banking 
regulators from NICs and LDCs like the Bank of Sierra Leone by sharing 
their knowledge and resources. The GATS encourages the developed 
countries to eschew using their own ideas of what constitutes good regu-
latory practice as a shield to exclude foreign banks. Rather, the G-10 
bank regulators ought to work with bank regulators from the NICs and 
LDCs to develop and implement supervisory standards that make sense 
in the economic, political, and cultural context of those countries and re-
gions. This ought to be done with a view to strengthening banks from 
NICs and LDCs and enhancing their ability to compete in every financial 
center. 
V. ACT III: THE LIMITED ROLL-UP 
THE SCENE 
Assume Maharajah Bank's application to the Federal Reserve to open 
a branch in New York is approved and the Bank commences operations. 
Maharajah Bank seeks to meet the banking needs of its NRI customers 
and, over time, identifies a significant demand for repatriation of funds. 
Many NRis want to deposit funds in Maharajah Bank in insured accounts 
and subsequently transfer portions of these funds to their families in In-
dia. In seeking to provide repatriation services, however, the Bank con-
fronts another alarming barrier: the subsidiary requirement. 
A. THE SUBSIDIARY REQUIREMENT 
Suppose that Maharajah Bank applies to open a branch (as opposed to 
an agency or representative office) in New York and, pursuant to the 
above laws and regulations, the application ultimately is approved. Be-
cause of Maharajah Bank's strategy to service NRis in the New York 
metropolitan area and repatriate their earnings to their families in India, 
the Bank seeks to take retail deposits. Under FBSEA and revised Regu-
lation K, no foreign bank branch established after December 19, 1991 can 
accept federally-insured retail deposits.137 To maintain domestic retail 
deposit accounts of less than $100,000 that require deposit insurance pro-
tection, a foreign bank must establish at least one banking subsidiary in 
the U.S. for that purpose and obtain deposit insurance for that subsidi-
137. Agencies and representative offices of foreign banks are unaffected because they 
are legally barred from accepting retail deposits. See Regulation K, 12 C.P.R.§ 211.22(b), 
(d), & (u) (1993) (definitions of "agency," "branch," and "representative office," respec-
tively); supra notes 36 & 45. 
In addition, branches establishe~ by foreign banks before December 19, 1991-the date 
of enactment of FBSEA-are unaffected. This is because of a grandfather rule that allows 
insured branches that held retail deposits of less than $100,000 before that date to continue 
to do so. See 12 U.S.C. § 3104(c) (Supp. IV 1992). 
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ary.138 This requirement repeals the IBA provisions that allowed U.S. 
branches of foreign banks to obtain deposit insurance from the FDIC. 
This "subsidiary requirement" means that if a foreign bank branch 
established after December 19, 1991 wants to accept insured retail depos-
its, it must convert from a branch to a subsidiary. Of course, as a practical 
matter, no bank (domestic or foreign) can engage in the retail deposit-
taking business without obtaining FDIC insurance. Depositors demand 
such insurance as a trade off for the low returns of a bank account rela-
tive to money market accounts, cash management accounts, mutual 
funds, and other products offered by securities firms. The new rule is, 
therefore, a limited "roll up" mandate directed toward foreign banks that 
want to begin retail banking activities in the U.S. A foreign bank like 
Maharajah Bank that wants to expand into this activity will have to roll 
up its branch into a subsidiary, or establish a subsidiary in addition to its 
branch, to do so. 
Accordingly, Maharajah Bank will have to apply to the Federal Re-
serve under the Bank Holding Company Act (BHC Act) to establish a de 
novo subsidiary or acquire an existing subsidiary. Maharajah Bank is 
subject to the BHC Act through FBSEA by virtue of maintaining a 
branch in the U.S.139 The BHC Act bars any company from becoming a 
"bank holding company" without prior Federal Reserve approval.140 Ma-
harajah Bank would become a bank holding company by virtue of its 
control over a subsidiary bank in the U.S.141 This application process was 
not altered by FBSEA or the revisions to Regulation K. 
B. THE TRAGEDY: MoRE CosTs 
1. The Capital Differential 
The subsidiary requirement is further evidence of the Niebuhr-like 
tragedy of the post-BCCI legal regime. It represents another non-tariff 
barrier to foreign bank entry in the post-BCCI foreign bank regulatory 
regime.142 This is because the subsidiary requirement imposes a serious 
138. 12 U.S.C. § 3104(c)(1)(A), (B). Initially, the statutory language incorrectly omit-
ted the word "retail;" however, the Federal Reserve enforced the statute only with respect 
to retail deposit-taking activity. See James R. Kraus, Foreign Banks Fear Burdens; Con-
gress Added U.S. Rules Atop State Laws, AM. BANKER, Dec. 27, 1991, at 2; Clyde Mitchell, 
Foreign Bank Licensing Options Under FDIC/A, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 26, 1992, at 3; Michael L. 
Whitener, New Federal Reserve Board Regulations Regarding Foreign Banks in the United 
States, 26 INT'L LAw. 1007, 1011 (1992). The statute was later corrected by the Housing 
and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 1604(a)(ll), 106 Stat. 
3672, 4083 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3104 (West Supp. 1994)). 
139. 12 U.S.C. § 3106(a) (Supp. IV 1992). 
140. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1988). 
141. ld. § 1841(a)(l). A "control" relationship exists if any one of three tests is satis-
fied: the company owns 25% or more of the voting securities of the subsidiary bank; the 
company controls the election of a majority of the board of directors of the subsidiary 
bank; or the company exercises a controlling influence over the management or policies of 
the subsidiary bank. ld. § 1841(a)(2). 
142. FBSEA requires the Secretary of the Treasury and federal bank regulatory agen-
cies to consider whether all U.S. operations of foreign banks ought to be conducted 
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additional cost on Maharajah Bank. The Bank faces the higher cost of 
establishing and operating a separately capitalized U.S. subsidiary, 
thereby making deposit-taking activity in the U.S. less appealing: 
If formal requirements for entry into a particular market by means 
of establishing an office raise the costs for an offshore entity relative 
to the gains foreseen from that mode of entry, the offshore organiza-
tion will remain offshore and participate in that market only by offer-
ing its services peripherally. If the U.S. indulges in raising this kind 
of barrier, whether for formalistic or protectionist reasons, ultimately 
the result of the indulgence will be to drive the market for U.S.-dol-
lar-denominated financial instruments and products offshore into 
markets that permit the entrants to choose freely the corporate struc-
ture that best responds to the particular entity's own assessment of 
its needs.143 
The reason for the ineluctable new cost lies in the differences in the 
capital of branches and subsidiaries. Deposits in a bank branch are 
backed by more capital than deposits in a bank subsidiary. In the branch, 
deposits and other liabilities are backed by the capital of the entire bank-
ing organization, because the branch is an extension of the organization. 
The subsidiary is a legally-distinct, separately-capitalized entity. Invaria-
bly, the amount of capital of a foreign bank's subsidiary in the U.S. will 
be less than that of the entire foreign banking organization. Thus, there is 
less capital to back the deposits and other liabilities of a subsidiary than a 
branch in the event the subsidiary or branch incurs losses and must 
charge the losses against capital. 
This capital differential has two important implications. First, branches 
are more competitive than subsidiaries.144 The loan capacity of a subsidi-
ary is always less than that of a branch because this capacity is based on 
through subsidiaries. Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 215, 105 Stat. 230 (1991). Their recently-pro-
duced study concludes that an "across-the-board roll up" was not presently needed. DE-
PARTMENT OF THE TREASURY AND BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
SYSTEM, SUBSIDIARY REQUIREMENT STUDY (1992) [hereinafter SuBSIDIARY REQUIRE-
MENT STUDY]. The conclusion is based on an analysis of several factors, most notably: (1) 
regulatory practices and safety and soundness; (2) national treatment and competitive eq-
uity; (3) international negotiations for liberalized trade; (4) the need to prohibit money 
laundering and illegal payments; (5) the tax liability of foreign banks; (6) differences in 
treatment of United States creditors under bankruptcy and receivership laws; and (7) inter-
national trade. ld. See also Treasury, Fed Advise Against Requiring Only U.S. Subsidiaries 
of Foreign Banks, 60 Banking Rep. (BNA) 14 (Jan. 4, 1993). 
Those who authored the subsidiary requirement study may not be the best suited to 
objectively analyze these factors-clearly, they are interested parties. Holding an open 
congressional hearing on the issue would allow for greater transparency as to deliberations 
and invite greater diversity among participants in the deliberations. More importantly, 
however, the fact that the authors considered international negotiations for liberalized 
trade is noteworthy. The argument above suggests that even the more limited version of 
the subsidiary requirement that was enacted into law represents a non-tariff barrier. 
143. Cynthia Lichtenstein, U.S. Restructuring Legislation: Revising the International 
Banking Act of 1978, for the Worse?, 60 FoRDHAM L. REv. S37, S46-7 (1992). 
144. As Professor Scott points out, of the $800 billion total foreign bank assets in the 
U.S., $626 billion are in agencies and branches, whereas only $174 billion are in subsidiar-
ies. Scott, supra note 104, at 491. 
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reduced capita1.145 The interest of U.S. borrowers is for foreign banks to 
have large lending capacity in order to help preclude the problem of a 
"credit crunch." But, a decrease in the supply of loanable funds could 
result from the conversion of foreign bank branches to subsidiary 
form. 146 
Similarly, financial market participants-i.e., banks and securities 
firms-have a strong incentive to favor a legal regime in which foreign 
bank operations in the U.S. are well capitalized. A foreign bank branch 
can engage in a larger volume of trading operations than a subsidiary 
because of the difference in capital. This extra capacity to conduct trans-
actions is important in the markets for foreign exchange, derivative prod-
ucts, and interbank lending and for the international competitive position 
of U.S. financial markets: 
One important consideration of global capital and its importance 
to banks that operate around the world, including American banks, 
relates to all kinds of trading activities, foreign exchange swaps, all 
kinds of interbank lending to one another. 
I would make the point that if you switch to the subsidiary ap-
proach, you are going to do a great boon for London, Paris, Rome, 
Zurich, and all these other cities where these great banks, including 
the American banks, would be able to trade on the strength of that 
full capital position when they are doing transactions with one 
another. 
When they came to New York and they traded with one another, 
they would be utilizing this much smaller capital base subsidiary. I 
think it would have a profound effect on the status of New York as 
an international financial center, and the jobs and all the economic 
benefits that have flowed to the State and city as a result.147 
More generally, a branch may be able to engage in larger and more di-
verse transactions because of this backing. If so, this suggests that a 
branch's potential revenues may be greater and its sources of revenue 
more diverse than would be the case for a subsidiary. 
The second implication of the differential capital bases concerns effi-
ciency. A branch can operate more efficiently than a subsidiary because 
of its larger capital base.148 The branch can obtain funds at lower cost. 
Lenders-namely, other banks who lend to the foreign bank in the inter-
bank market and investors who purchase securities issued by the foreign 
bank-face less risk in dealing with a branch, as opposed to a subsidiary. 
145. James R. Kraus, U.S. Banks Fighting Plan to Curb Foreign Institutions, AM. 
BANKER, Nov. 30, 1992, at 2 ("[A] separately capitalized banking subsidiary would have a 
far lower U.S. lending limit than does a branch, which bases its lending limit on its parent's 
capital."). 
146. See Regulation of Foreign Banks: Hearing before House Comm. on Banking, Fi-
nance and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (1991) (prepared text of Vincent Con-
lon, Acting Superintendent of Banking, New York State Department of Banking). 
147. !d. at 55 (testimony of Lawrence R. Uhlick, Executive Director and Counsel, Insti-
tute of International Bankers). 
148. See id. at 8, 78 (testimony and prepared text of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). 
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If the subsidiary becomes insolvent, the lenders can look only to the sub-
sidiary's capital to satisfy their claims. Given this competitive advantage 
of the branch over the subsidiary, there is no surprise that as of June 
1992, eighty-two percent of all U.S. assets held in foreign banks were 
maintained in branches or agencies instead of subsidiaries.149 
Consequently, requiring Maharajah Bank to obtain deposit insurance 
through subsidiaries forces it to operate in a less efficient manner. The 
disadvantages of the smaller capital base such as the increased cost of 
funding makes operating in the U.S. less attractive. The disadvantages 
are manifest after Maharajah Bank's subsidiary commences operations in 
the U.S. 
2. Start-up Costs 
Yet, the cost headaches begin well before operations are commenced. 
Maharajah Bank, or Maharajah Bank Holding Company, will have to 
generate sufficient capital to downstream to the new U.S. subsidiary 
which must be capitalized. One way of doing this is for the Holding Com-
pany to issue securities and transfer the proceeds from the offering to the 
Bank in exchange for an obligation from the Bank. A second method is 
to re-allocate liquid resources that the Bank or Holding Company has on 
hand. In either case, there is a cost. Selling securities entails both issu-
ance and costs of funding. If equity capital is raised, then dividends must 
be paid to investors. If debt is issued, then interest must be paid to inves-
tors, after paying the costs of issuing the debt. Reallocating existing liq-
uid resources entails opportunity costs. Those resources might have been 
put to a use that would earn a greater return, but for the subsidiary re-
quirement of FBSEA and revised Regulation K. 
c. THE IRONY: ORGANIZATIONAL FORM 
1. The Incongruity with GATS Article XVI 
The subsidiary requirement means that foreign banks that seek deposit 
insurance do not have a choice as to corporate form. They must provide 
retail deposit-taking services through a subsidiary. Yet, the GATS pre-
vents Members that have undertaken a market access commitment re-
garding a sector or sub-sector, unless otherwise specified in a schedule, 
from implementing "measures which restrict or require specific types of 
legal entity ... through which a service supplier may supply a service. "150 
149. SuBSIDIARY REQUIREMENT STUDY, supra note 142, at 2. See also Treasury, Fed 
Advise Against Requiring Only U.S. Subsidiaries of Foreign Banks, 60 Banking Rep. 
(BNA) 14 (Jan. 4, 1993). 
150. GATS, supra note 5, art. XVI:2(e). Interestingly, the subsidiary requirement 
seems to be at variance with the liberalizing trend in cross-border banking services in other 
major industrialized countries. France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United King-
dom insure deposits held in branches of foreign banks. Phillip F. Bartholomew & Vicki A. 
Vanderhoff, Foreign Deposit Insurance Systems: A Comparison, 45 CoNSUMER FIN. L.Q. 
REP. 243, 248 (1991). (At the same time, certain countries-Australia, Canada, Norway, 
and Sweden, for instance-allow foreign banks to operate only through subsidiaries.) See 
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There are three ways to attempt to resolve this incongruity: the USTR 
can eschew entering into a market access commitment on banking; the 
USTR can reserve the right to impose a subsidiary requirement on for-
eign banks in a schedule pertaining to a market access commitment; or, 
the Congress and Federal Reserve can repeal the subsidiary requirement. 
The third alternative is the best. Failing to enter into a market access 
commitment means U.S. consumers of banking services are deprived of 
benefits resulting from foreign bank competition for their business. 
Fewer banking services and products may be offered, and those that are 
available may cost more. The lack of foreign bank competition dampens 
liquidity, reduces the introduction of new banking innovations, and raises 
the specter of a credit crunch.151 Specifying the subsidiary requirement in 
a schedule presupposes it is a sound requirement-which it is not, for the 
aforementioned reasons concerning costs and efficiency.152 
2. The Incongruity with GATS Article VI 
The subsidiary requirement also could be incongruous with a second 
provision of the GATS, namely, the Article VI:4 requirement that "meas-
ures relating to qualification requirements and procedures [and] technical 
standards" are not "unnecessary barriers to trade" and are "not more 
burdensome than necessary." Presumably, this is a "qualification re-
quirement," in that only a foreign bank's subsidiary is qualified to main-
tain insured retail deposit accounts. Arguably, this requirement is also a 
"technical standard." Whether the subsidiary requirement is an "unnec-
essary barrier" or "more burdensome than necessary" could depend, in 
part, on the outcome of a cost-benefit calculation: are the increased 
transaction costs and reduced efficiencies imposed on a foreign bank by 
compelling it to form a subsidiary outweighed by the additional protec-
tion afforded to creditors of that subsidiary? 
This calculation requires a prognostication regarding two scenarios 
about Maharajah Bank. In the first scenario, Maharajah Bank's U.S. sub-
sidiary maintains insured retail deposits and it fails. The subsidiary is liq-
uidated by the FDIC.153 In the second scenario, Maharajah Bank's U.S. 
Regulation of Foreign Banks: Hearing before House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Ur-
ban Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1991) (statement of Rep. Roth). Indeed, in Ger-
many, deposits in all currencies held in foreign bank branches are insured. In the United 
Kingdom sterling-denominated deposits are insured. 
Certainly, U.S. banks prefer to operate overseas through branches rather than subsidiar-
ies. Generally, 64% of all foreign assets held by U.S. banks abroad are held in branches. 
SuBSIDIARY REQUIREMENT STUDY, supra note 142, at 2 n.l. 
Note that Mexico's subsidiary requirement which will continue to be effective after the 
transition period ends in the year 2000 would appear to run afoul of the GATS require-
ment discussed above. 
151. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text. 
152. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text. 
153. The liquidation would be conducted under the authority of Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Act, as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811, 1834b (1988). See especially 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821-
23 (concerning the powers and duties of the FDIC as a receiver). The FDIC would be 
appointed receiver because Maharajah Bank's subsidiary is an "insured depository institu-
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branch maintains such deposits-i.e., the subsidiary requirement does not 
exist and, therefore, Maharajah Bank makes use of the cheaper corporate 
form. In this scenario, Maharajah Bank-the parent organization-fails 
and is the subject of a liquidation proceeding based in Bombay. In which 
scenario are depositors with accounts over $100,000 and other creditors 
better off? 
The answer is not clear. In the first scenario, there is a smaller pool of 
capital backing the failed entity than in the second scenario. Depositors 
with accounts over $100,000, as well as other creditors of the failed sub-
sidiary, risk being paid less than the full value of their claims. But, in the 
first scenario there is no risk that a foreign liquidator will attempt to con-
solidate the assets of Maharajah Bank's U.S. branch in the Bombay pro-
ceeding and stay the claims of its U.S. depositors and other creditors.154 
In the second scenario, the depositors and other creditors risk being 
forced to participate in the Bombay insolvency proceeding under Indian 
insolvency law. If so, their claims may not be treated so favorably as 
would be the case in a U.S. proceeding under federal banking law with 
the FDIC as receiver. A larger pool of capital, however, backs their 
claims. The outcome of the cost-benefit calculation is not clear and, in-
deed, may differ from one case to the next. 
In deciding whether the subsidiary requirement is an "unnecessary bar-
rier" or "more burdensome than necessary" under GATS, the interests of 
the FDIC are relevant. While these interests should be similar to those of 
depositors with funds of less than $100,000, they are not co-extensive with 
those of larger depositors or other creditors (because they do not receive 
the full benefit of deposit insurance155). The FDIC's concern about the 
exposure of the deposit insurance fund to "another BCCI" helps explain 
the logic in favor of the subsidiary requirement: 
The chief argument in favor of requiring foreign banks to conduct 
operations in the United States via subsidiaries is that, if a foreign 
bank fails, U.S. regulators can more easily protect persons or entities 
that deal with the bank's U.S. subsidiary than those that deal with a 
U.S. branch or agency. The regulators can afford better protection 
because a subsidiary has its own capital and its own distinct assets 
and liabilities, is subject to restrictions on transactions with its parent 
bank, and can survive or fail independently of its owners. A branch 
or agency, in contrast, has no separate capital, may deal with the 
tion." See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(c)(2), 1821(c)(1). For a discussion of bank insolvency law, see 
Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency Law Now That It Matters Again, 42 DuKE L.J. 469 (1992) 
(questioning the rationale for special rules for bank insolvency). 
154. Even if a liquidation proceeding had been commenced in the U.S., the foreign 
liquidator might have the power to do this. Indeed, using Section 304 of the federal bank-
ruptcy code (11 U.S.C. § 304 (1988)), the liquidator of BCCI Holdings and BCCI, S.A., 
attempted to consolidate the assets of BCCI's U.S. agencies into the Luxembourg-based 
insolvency proceeding and stay creditor actions in the U.S. Ultimately, a settlement was 
reached between the Luxembourg liquidator and the state bank regulators that allowed 
$250 million of BCCI's $550 million U.S. assets to remain in the U.S. See BHALA, supra 
note 3, at ch. X (discussing foreign insolvency proceedings and the BCCI experience). 
155. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1) (1988). 
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home office or other branches without restriction, and will fail if the 
bank as a whole fails.156 
57 
Ideally, the FDIC wants to look to the assets of a separately capitalized 
subsidiary in the event of a need to make depositors whole if a foreign 
bank fails. The FDIC is concerned about a scenario in which a foreign 
bank with U.S. branches that take insured retail deposits becomes insol-
vent. The FDIC is not likely to be able to reach the foreign bank's assets 
located outside of the U.S. Nor is the FDIC likely to relish the prospect 
of litigating with a trustee or receiver of the parent foreign bank in an-
other jurisdiction about who has the right to consolidate the foreign 
bank's U.S. assets.157 
For three reasons, the FDIC's concern may be overstated. In turn, the 
possibility that the subsidiary requirement is more burdensome than nec-
essary may be strengthened. First, there are limits on the activities of 
foreign bank operations in the U.S. Under FBSEA, a state-licensed for-
eign bank branch is permitted to engage only in those activities that are 
permissible for a federally-licensed foreign bank branch.158 In turn, a 
federally-licensed foreign bank branch can do only what national banks 
are permitted to do by the OCC.159 The same limitation on loans made 
to a single borrower that applies to a national bank also applies to a state 
or federal branch of a foreign bank.160 In effect, there is national treat-
ment regarding the activities of a foreign bank branch and a national 
bank. 
The only exception to these limitations expressly accounts for the risks 
to the FDIC insurance fund. A state-licensed branch or agency of a for-
eign bank cannot engage in an activity that is not permissible for a federal 
branch or agency unless the Federal Reserve determines that the activity 
is "safe and sound" and does not pose a threat to the FDIC's deposit 
insurance fund.161 
Thus, at least in theory, a foreign bank branch engaging in an activity that 
poses an undue risk to the deposit insurance fund should be an impossi-
bility. As long as these limitations on activities are in effect, there may be 
no need to force foreign bank deposit-taking activities into subsidiaries. 
Of course, these limitations do not guarantee that the bank will remain 
solvent. Bad management, fraud, or poor economic conditions may cause 
a bank to fail. 
Second, single borrower lending limits applicable to foreign bank 
branches help prevent undue concentrations of credit risk, which, in turn, 
156. Michael L. Whitener, New Federal Reserve Board Regulations Regarding Foreign 
Banks in the United States, 26 INT'L LAw. 1007, 1013 (1992). 
157. This problem occurred in the BCCI case. The Luxembourg-based receiver at-
tempted-but ultimately was unsuccessful-to obtain control over the assets of BCCI's 
New York and California agencies. See BHALA, supra note 3, at ch. X (discussing foreign 
insolvency proceedings and the BCCI experience). 
158. 12 U.S.C. § 3105(h) (Supp. IV 1992). 
159. Jd. § 3102(b). 
160. ld. §§ 3102(b), 3105(h)(2). 
161. Jd. § 3105(h)(1). 
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can lead to problems, or even insolvency, at a foreign bank. Under FB-
SEA, a state-licensed branch of a foreign bank is subject to the same 
lending limits as a federal branch. All of the outstanding loans extended 
by all of the U.S. branches of the same foreign bank to a single borrower 
are aggregated to calculate the limit on loans to one borrower.162 This 
formula is an important safeguard that did not exist in the pre-BCCI legal 
regime. Under the IBA, each state-licensed branch in the U.S. could lend 
to the same borrower based on the total capital of the foreign bank, and 
there was no requirement for aggregating loans. 
Third, there are no cases of claims on the FDIC insurance fund arising 
from the inability of a foreign bank to meet its insured deposit liabili-
ties.163 In part, the absence of claims may be due to the stronger capital 
position of foreign bank branches versus subsidiaries and the pre-BCCI 
tradition of taking deposits through branches.164 Moreover, the record in 
the BCCI case suggests that state banking laws, when used adroitly by 
state bank regulators, help protect the interests of U.S. creditors of for-
eign banks.165 The New York State Banking Department (NYSBD) suc-
cessfully used state preference laws to ensure that creditors of BCCI's 
New York agency were paid in full.1 66 NYSBD employed the technique 
of "ring-fencing" BCCI's New York agency, that is, sealing it off from its 
parent foreign bank and affiliates.167 In effect, the form of BCCI's New 
York operation-an agency-was disregarded; the state bank regulator 
treated the agency as if it were a separate entity from its parent organiza-
tion, BCCI, S.A., in Luxembourg. 
VI. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A MARKET-ORIENTED 
APPROACH 
Reinhold Niebuhr furnishes definitions of "tragedy" and "irony" that 
fit the post-BCCI legislative and regulatory play in which Maharajah 
Bank must act if it wants to do business in the U.S. The enactment of 
FBSEA and revision of Regulation K by Congress and the Federal Re-
serve, respectively, have tragic effects on the access of foreign banks to 
the U.S. market and create an ironic incongruity with the efforts of the 
162. 12 U.S.C. § 3102(b) (Supp. IV 1992) (regarding federal branches and agencies); 12 
U.S.C. § 3105(h)(2) (Supp. IV 1992) (regarding state branches and agencies); Regulation 
K, 12 C.F.R. § 211.29 (1993). 
163. New York State Bar Association, International Law and Practice Section, Com-
mittee on International Banking, Securities, and Financial Transactions, Treatment of For-
eign Banks in Bank Restructuring Bills, 5 INT'L L. PRACTICUM 25, 27 (1992). 
164. See supra notes 142-49 and accompanying text. 
165. To be sure, the world-wide closure of BCCI on July 5, 1991 posed no risk to the 
FDIC insurance fund because it operated in the U.S. as an agency and, therefore, could not 
lawfully accept insured retail deposits. See supra note 36 (discussing the legal distinction 
between agencies and branches). 
166. See BHALA, supra note 3, at ch. III (discussing the irony regarding state banking 
regulators); ch. V (discussing the performance of state banking regulators in the BCCI 
case); ch. X (discussing paying claims and the principle of non-discrimination). 
167. One could argue that the subsidiary requirement essentially formalizes and feder-
alizes the ring-fencing technique. For a .:ritical analysis of ring-fencing, see id. at ch. X. 
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USTR to negotiate a GATS. In the words of Professor Niebuhr, the leg-
islators and regulators have done "evil in a good cause" and "cover[ed] 
themselves with guilt in order to fulfill some high responsibility."168 
Therein lies the tragedy. The "virtue" of tougher regulation of foreign 
banks is, upon closer examination, a "vice" because of the "hidden de-
fect" of protectionism, the irony. 
Because of the new foreign bank regulatory regime, Maharajah Bank 
must obtain a Federal Reserve license to operate a branch, agency, or 
representative office in the U.S. Maharajah Bank's ability to procure this 
will depend in large part on a standard of appraisal-home-country, com-
prehensive, consolidated supervision-that disfavors banks of "its kind." 
If Maharajah Bank gets the license and subsequently seeks to do what it 
does best, namely, provide banking services to expatriate workers, then it 
must incur substantial new costs to convert its branch to, or open anew, a 
subsidiary. Efforts of the USTR to guarantee access to foreign banking 
markets for American banks under the auspices of the GATS naturally 
imply a reciprocal openness to the U.S. market for foreign banks. The 
non-tariff barriers faced by Maharajah Bank illustrate that America's 
post-BCCI foreign bank regulatory scheme is not consonant with its in-
ternational trade policies. Greater efforts to ensure that the U.S. banking 
market is not closed to foreign banks like Maharajah Bank are needed; 
otherwise, the many economic benefits brought by them will be lost. 
This situation is unacceptable. U.S. policies toward foreign banks and 
international trade in banking services must be formed in a way that is 
least destructive to the fundamental value of free trade. At the same 
time, a minimally interventionist amount of prudential vigilance against 
infiltration of the U.S. banking market by unsafe, unsound, or fraudulent 
foreign banks is needed. In their book, Tragic Choices, Professors Cala-
bresi and Bobbit effectively use the concept of tragedy and consider ap-
proaches to tragic choices, in a manner that illuminates the current 
unacceptable situation. For them, a tragic choice is one that implies "the 
rejection of values which are proclaimed to be fundamental."169 The es-
sence of a tragic choice is, therefore, the sacrifice of a value like free 
trade-an insight akin to that suggested by Niebuhr's definition of 
tragedy. 
Unlike Niebuhr, however, Calabresi and Bobbit identify the source of 
a tragic choice: the scarcity of goods or resources. Licenses for foreign 
banks to operate in the U.S. are conceptually analogous to scarce goods 
or resources. To be sure, the causes of the scarcity are different. Goods 
and services may be scarce because of constraints on the factors of pro-
duction that are used to make them (for example, land, labor, physical 
capital, and human capital is limited). In contrast, licenses may be scarce 
because of a rule that limits the number that may be issued. Or, as in the 
168. NIEBUHR, supra note 1, at vii. 
169. Gumo CALABRESI & PHILLIP BoBBIT, TRAGIC CHOICES 195 (1978) [hereinafter 
TRAGIC CHOICEs]. See also id. at 18, 198. 
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case of Federal Reserve licensing of foreign banks, they may be scarce 
because of agency behavior (i.e., the bureaucratic process and associated 
costs). But, while goods and services may be scarce for real economic 
reasons and licenses may be scarce for artificial legal and political rea-
sons, the practical effect is the same. The supply of the item cannot ex-
pand to meet current demand. There is excess demand for the item. If 
the market is allowed to operate, a stable equilibrium between supply 
and demand is reached through a rise in the price of the item. 
With respect to scarce goods and resources, decisions must be made 
about how much to produce and how to distribute what is produced-so-
called first- and second-order determinations.17° The same production 
and allocation determinations must be made for scarce licenses. First, 
how many foreign banks should be allowed into the U.S.? Second, which 
foreign banks should be let in? These decisions lead to an inevitable ten-
sion between fundamental values such as life and well-being, on the one 
hand, and distributional mechanisms to assign entitlements to benefi-
ciaries, on the other hand. Or, in the present context, the decisions led to 
tension between open banking markets and the prevention of future 
BCCI-type affairs. 
In the long run, the tension, suggest Calabresi and Bobbit, is never re-
solved. "[S]ociety faces the paradox of being forced to choose among 
competing values in a general context in which none can, for long, be 
abandoned. "171 The object of public policy is, therefore, "to define with 
respect to each particular tragic choice, that combination of approaches 
which most limits tragedy."172 The play starring Maharajah Bank sug-
gests that the current policy concerning foreign bank regulation and inter-
national trade in banking services exacerbates, rather than limits, the 
tragedy. That policy is called, in Tragic Choices, a "pure political ap-
proach."173 Scarce foreign bank licenses are allocated by the Federal Re-
serve according to "standards set up through a responsible political 
process."174 The problems with this approach have been shown in the 
three Acts of the play. In the language of Calabresi and Bobbit, the polit-
ical approach discriminates against disfavored groups, such as banks from 
NICs and LDCs, because the standards for political decision-making orig-
inate in sociallife.115 Moreover, the political approach to tragic choices 
does not give effect to individual contexts, such as the needs and desires 
of a particular bank, like Maharajah Bank or its prospective consumers, 
like the NRis in New York. Finally, the current approach necessarily 
means that a bureaucracy such as the Federal Reserve picks winners 
(those foreign banks that get licenses) and losers (those that do not). 
170. Id. at 19. 
171. /d. at 196. 
172. /d. at 149 (footnote omitted, emphasis added). 
173. Id. at 34-41. 
174. Id. at 34. 
175. ld. at 49. 
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This is not to suggest that a lottery, which is a second approach to mak-
ing tragic choices, would be preferable to the political approach. In the-
ory, there could be a lottery in which foreign bank applicants were 
granted licenses to do business in the U.S. based on a random selection of 
a small percentage of the names of all the applicants. Yet, a lottery would 
be "a choice not to choose."176 The lottery suffers from a naive concep-
tion of equality among foreign bank applicants (that all are equally wor-
thy of getting a license and equally important to prospective U.S. 
customers) and gives no weight to the interests of either individual for-
eign banks or the banking system as a whole. The worst feature of a 
lottery would be its spotlight on the fixed quota of foreign bank licenses 
available.177 There would be no explanation of how the fixed supply was 
established, or why it should be fixed in the first place. 
A third approach identified by Calabresi and Bobbit allows the market 
to allocate scarce goods and resources. The first- and second-order deter-
minations depend on the price of the good or resource and the willing-
ness and ability of prospective consumers to pay. While Calabresi and 
Bobbit have reservations about this approach to tragic choices, it might 
be a promising remedy for the lack of consonance between the post-
BCCI foreign bank regulatory regime and U.S. international trade poli-
cies. Indeed, this market approach appears to underlie many of the pro-
visions of the GATS. 
A market approach would have two basic features. First, there would 
be no explicit or implicit cap on the number of foreign banks allowed in 
the U.S. or on the number of branches, agencies, or representative offices 
they could establish. At present, there is no such cap per se, though the 
comprehensive, consolidated supervision standard effectively establishes 
a low threshold on the number of foreign banks from countries outside 
the G-10. The potentially discriminatory aspects of this standard would 
have to be eliminated. 
Second, decisions as to which foreign banks could establish and main-
tain a presence would depend, largely, on which ones could afford to do 
so, not on bureaucratic decision-making. In turn, each potential foreign 
bank entrant would make a cost-benefit calculation to see if direct invest-
ment in the U.S. would be worthwhile. This calculation would not need 
to take into account many of the transaction costs discussed in Act I that 
are presently incurred by foreign bank applicantsP8 Bank regulators 
like the Federal Reserve would examine established foreign bank opera-
tions for safety and soundness purposes, just as they examine certain do-
mestic bank operations. But, the initial barriers to market access posed 
by FBSEA and revised Regulation K would be reduced substantially by, 
for instance, eliminating the Federal Reserve licensing requirement or 
greatly streamlining the procedures associated therewith. 
176. ld. at 41. 
177. Id. at 49, 145-46. 
178. See supra notes 48-65 and accompanying text. 
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Overall, the aim of the market approach would be to change the bur-
den of proof in the manner suggested above.179 The Federal Reserve 
would have to show why regulatory burdens that depart from the pre-
sumption in favor of free trade in financial services should be permitted 
and why a particular foreign bank applicant is a potential BCCI. 
A market approach would not be without problems. As Calabresi and 
Bobbit point out, the outcome of a pure market approach to tragic 
choices depends on the prevailing distribution of wealth, i.e., it raises 
egalitarian concerns. Perhaps, then, bigger and better established foreign 
banks would find entering and competing in the U.S. banking market eas-
ier than would small banks from NICs and LDCs.180 Nevertheless, what 
might be commendable about the two features of the market approach is 
their promise of equality of opportunity for foreign banks to enter and 
participate in the U.S. banking market. If a foreign bank cannot enter 
this market, or is unable to engage in certain banking activities through 
its existing U.S. operations, then at least this feature will be for objective 
market reasons and not the result of the overreaction of legislators and 
regulators to a unique case of a fraudulent foreign bank. 
179. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. 
180. Other problems include the neglect of societal preferences and the cost of costing. 
TRAGIC CHOICES, supra note 169, at 144. The former seems less of a concern in the bank-
ing context than in the situations discussed by Calabresi and Bobbit as long as there is 
some, albeit scaled down, role for bank regulators and their prudential safeguards. The 
latter, which refers to the cost of putting a price on an item that is viewed as priceless, also 
seems comparatively unimportant. While foreign banks with global aspirations are eager 
to set up operations in the legal U.S., the right to do so is hardly viewed as priceless. 
There are approaches in addition to the three identified above, most notably the modi-
fied political and market approaches. See id. at 44-49, 53-127, 146. These other ap-
proaches, however, suffer from a variety of defects, including subterfuge-they wrongly 
indicate that a tragic choice is avoided. 
